NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES
Tuesday, April 1, 2003
Alexander Hamilton U.S. Custom House Auditorium
One Bowling Green
New York, York
BORDERS, MONEY, AND TRANSPORTATION SECURITY
Glenn Fine, U.S. Department of Justice
Lee Wolosky, Boies, Schiller & Flexner LLP
Gerald Dillingham, Civil Aviation Issues, General Accounting Offices
Questions and Answers
LAW ENFORCEMENT, DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE, AND HOMELAND SECURITY
Steven Brill, Author
Michael Wermuth, RAND
Zoe Baird, Markle Foundation
Randy Larsen, ANSER Institute for Homeland Security
Questions and Answers
IMMEDIATE RESPONSE TO THE ATTACKS
Shawn Kelley, Arlington County Fire Department
William Baker, American Society of Civil Engineers
Ken Holden, New York Department of Design and Constructio
Questions and Answers
MR. KEAN: As we start I want to do
two things. One is to make part of the
permanent record we have a statement here
from Senator Lieberman, who sent in a statement
to make part of our record, and a statement
from Chris Chez from Connecticut. We will make
both those statements part of the permanent
I also want to recognize people who
should have been recognized yesterday, I think,
because they are absolutely vital to our work.
Phil Zelikow, our Executive Director who is
behind me with Chris Kojm, Deputy Director and
Dan Marcus, who is General Counsel. They are
absolutely essential, and will be, to our work.
I want to recognize, as well,
Stephanie Kaplan and Tracey Shycoff, who did
all the work really to put these hearings
together these two days.
Our first panel this morning is on
borders, money and transportation security.
Let me see, we are missing one person
I thought was going to be here. Alright, so
going in order no, I'm alright, I am looking
at the wrong one.
We start out with Glenn Fine, unless
you have some sort of order you all would like
to go in?
MR. KEAN: Okay, from the U.S.
Department of Justice.
MR. FINE: Mr. Chairman, Mr. Vice
Chairman, and Members of the National
Commission, I appreciate the opportunity to
testify before the Commission about the work of
the Department of Justice Office of the
Inspector General on border security issues.
Both before and after the September 11
terrorist attacks, we have focused much of our
resources on these and other national security
issues in the Department of Justice.
Today, I will describe findings from
several of these reviews that examined programs
in the Immigration and Naturalization Service.
That agency had responsibility for immigration
and border security issues until March 1, 2003,
when it was transferred into the new Department
of Homeland Security.
At the outset of my remarks, I want to
stress that while we have noted serious
deficiencies over the years in various INS
operations, this should in no way diminish the
important work of thousands of INS employees,
now DHS employees. Most of them perform
diligently, under very difficult circumstances,
and their mission is critical to the security
of our country. Yet, our reviews have revealed
significant problems that left gaps in the
INS's attempts to secure the nation's borders.
In one important review, we examined
the INS's contacts with two September 11
terrorists Mohamed Atta and Marwan Alshehhi.
We investigated how these two were admitted in
the United States. We also examined how, six
months after the terrorist attacks, a Florida
flight school received notification that Atta
and Alshehhi's applications to change their
immigration status from "visitors" to
"students" had been approved. The mailing of
these forms raised serious concerns about the
INS's tracking of foreign students in the
With regard to Atta and Alshehhi's
entries into the U.S., the evidence did not
show that the inspectors who admitted them
violated INS policies and practices.
However, our review found that the
adjudication of their change of status
applications was untimely and significantly
flawed. The INS took more that 10 months to
adjudicate the applications, well after Atta
and Alshehhi had finished their training course
at the Florida flight school. In addition, the
INS adjudicator who approved their applications
did so without adequate information, including
the fact that they had left the country twice
after filing their applications, which meant
they had abandoned their request for a change
We also found that historically the
INS has devoted little attention to monitoring
foreign students, and its paper based tracking
system was inefficient, inaccurate, and
unreliable. The new internet based foreign
student tracking system, called SEVIS, has the
potential to dramatically improve the foreign
Last month, the OIG completed a
follow up review to assess the INS's progress
in implementing the SEVIS system. We found
that while the INS has made progress, the
system is not fully implemented. Significant
deficiencies remain, such as a lack of adequate
oversight and training of contractors hired to
conduct site visits of schools, and a lack of
procedures to identify and refer potential
fraud for enforcement action.
In my written statement, I describe in
greater detail a series of other reviews that
the OIG has conducted on border security
issues. One review examined the INS's efforts
to prevent illegal immigration along the
northern border. Until recently, the INS
devoted significant resources to deterring
illegal immigration along the southwest border,
but did not focus such attention on the
northern border. For example, as late as 1999,
only 311 of the national total of approximately
8,000 Border Patrol agents were assigned to the
northern border. We concluded that the level
of illegal activity on the northern border
clearly exceeded the Border Patrol's capacity
After September 11, we issued a
follow up review that found the INS had made
some improvements to enhance the security of
the northern border. However, we concluded
that increased staffing and resources for the
northern border continued to be a critical
We also have conducted other reviews
related to border security. For example: We
reviewed the INS's record in deporting aliens
who have been issued final orders of removal.
We found that the INS removed 92 percent of
detained aliens with final removal orders, but
only 13 percent of non detained aliens.
In addition, we reviewed the Visa
Waiver Program which allows visitors from 28
countries to enter the U.S. without first
obtaining a visa. We found that INS inspectors
did not check passports of all of these
visitors against the INS's computerized lookout
system, and that the use of stolen passports
from some of these visa waiver countries
presented a serious problem.
A theme we found repeated in many of
our reviews was that the INS's information
technology systems needed significant
improvement. Many OIG reviews have questioned
the reliability of the INS's information
systems and the accuracy of the data produced
In addition, INS information systems
are not always integrated with other agencies'
systems. For example, the INS and the FBI
developed their agency's automated fingerprint
identification systems separately, and full
integration of the systems remains years away.
I also want to mention, briefly, one
other review that, while not addressing border
security issues, does relate squarely to the
At the request of FBI Director Mueller
in June 2002, we initiated a review to examine
aspects of the FBI's handling of intelligence
information prior to the September 11 attacks.
Our review focuses on how the FBI handled an
electronic communication written by an agent in
its Phoenix office regarding extremists
attending flight schools in Arizona. Our
review also is examining aspects of the FBI's
handling of the Moussaoui investigation and its
handling of other intelligence before September
11. I believe the final results of this review
will be useful to the Commission, and we intend
to cooperate fully with your review of these
Based on the significant body of work
by the OIG during the last several years, I
believe there are several broad themes that the
Commission may want to examine relating to
First, information and intelligence
sharing among all levels of government remains
a critical component of the effort to prevent
terrorist attacks in the United States.
Without adequate intelligence, the ability of
front line employees to screen effectively
those who seek to enter the country is limited.
Second, our reviews have found that
the current systems for identifying when aliens
enter and leave the country are clearly
inadequate. Implementing an effective
entry exit tracking system is a daunting
challenge that will require substantial efforts
and a large investment of resources.
Third, we encourage the Commission to
focus on the often overlooked issue of human
capital. To fulfill its mission, the
Department of Homeland Security must have
sufficiently trained immigration staff and
supervisors. Historically, this has been a
challenge for the INS.
Fourth, I think it is also important to
note that timely and consistent processing of
the millions of benefit applications has been a
longstanding problem for the INS, and now for
the DHS. An enhanced focus on border security
should not override this important
service related responsibility.
And finally, the transfer of the INS
to the Department of Homeland Security presents
enormous management challenges. The transfer
will not, in itself, resolve the issues I have
identified today. Solutions to border security
issues will require innovation and aggressive
In sum, I believe that these border
security issues present many potential areas
for the Commission to examine in the months
head. We will be pleased to provide any
information or assistance to the Commission as
it performs this critically important task.
That concludes my statement. I would
be pleased to answer any questions.
MR. KEAN: I think we will do the
panel and come back, probably with questions.
Lee Wolosky from Boies, Schiller &
Flexner, come in.
MR. WOLOSKY: Thank you for inviting
me to testify before you on the subject of
terrorist financing. It is an honor and a
privilege to be able to appear before you
Unlike other terrorist leaders, Osama
bin Laden is neither a military hero, a
religious authority, or an obvious
representative of the downtrodden and
disillusioned. Rather he is a rich financier.
He built al Qaeda's financial network from the
foundation of a system originally designed to
channel resources to the mujahadeen fighting
the Soviets in Afghanistan the 1980s.
Thanks to the leadership of the Bush
administration that network has been disrupted,
but it has certainly not been destroyed. And
as long as al Qaeda retains access to a viable
financial network, it will remain a lethal threat
to the United States.
Like al Qaeda itself, its financial
network is deliberately compartmentalized, and
is characterized by layers and redundancies.
Al Qaeda raises money from a variety of sources
and moves money in a variety of manners. It
runs businesses operating under the cloak of
legitimacy and criminal conspiracies ranging
from the petty to the grand. The most
important source of al Qaeda's money, however,
is its continuous fund raising efforts.
Al Qaeda's global fund raising network
is built upon a foundation of charities,
nongovernment organizations, mosques, Muslim
community centers, web sites, intermediaries,
facilitators and banks and other financial
institutions. Some whose money goes to
al Qaeda know full well the illicit and violent
purposes that it will further. Other donors
believe their money will fund legitimate
humanitarian efforts, but the money is
nonetheless diverted to al Qaeda. For years,
individuals and charities based in Saudi Arabia
have been the most important source of funds
for al Qaeda.
Al Qaeda moves its funds through the
global financial system, the Islamic banking
system, and the underground hawala system,
among other money transfer mechanisms. It uses
its global network of businesses and charities
as a cover for moving funds. And it uses such
time honored methods as bulk cash smuggling and
the global trade in gold and other commodities
to both move and store value.
Following September 11, 2001, the Bush
administration, building on the policies of the
previous administration, undertook tactical
actions to disrupt particular individual nodes
in the terrorist financial network and
strategic initiatives to change the environment
within which terrorists raise and move funds.
Tactical initiatives include law
enforcement and intelligence activities, along
with public designations under the
International Emergency Economic Powers Act
(IEEPA) of persons, businesses, and financial
institutions associated with the financial
network of al Qaeda and other terrorist
Since much of the subject matter is
highly classified, the effectiveness of
tactical measures is difficult to determine.
Clearly, there have been successes, such as the
recent action targeting the al-Farooq mosque
just across the East River from here.
Successes have been made possible due to
markedly improved law enforcement and tactical
intelligence cooperation from foreign states
since September 11.
By contract, progress in the strategic
arena, in my judgement, has simply not been
made a high enough priority. Far too many key
countries, including virtually all in the
Middle East and South Asia, still have in place
ineffective or rudimentary bank supervisory and
anti money laundering regimes. In no country,
including the United States, are either Islamic
charities or the underground hawala system
Fundamentally, U.S. efforts to curtail
the financing of terrorism are impeded not only
by a lack of institutional capacity abroad, but
by a lack of political will among key foreign
partners. Some have a history of ignoring the
problem. Some perceive, correctly or
incorrectly, that the U.S.'s attention on the
subject has waned. Some simply disagree with
the U.S. view of the nature and severity of the
Confronted with this lack of political
will, the current administration, in my view,
has not made full use of all relevant and legal
policy tools at its disposal. For example,
punitive provisions of Title III of the USA
PATRIOT ACT enable the Executive Branch to
restrict or prohibit access to the U.S.
financial system for foreign states or foreign
financial institutions that lack adequate
anti money laundering regimes. This powerful
tool remains unused in a terrorist financing
Finally, I would like to say a few
words about the war in Iraq, which I support,
but which I fear may retard progress on these
Even supporters of the war must
concede that the United States has not
effectively justified the war to many members
of the international community.
This state of affairs may set back
ongoing U.S. efforts to fight terrorism.
Terrorist financing is a transnational problem
requiring transnational solutions. In almost
all cases, the money trail leads or originates
overseas. Curtailing terrorist financing
therefore requires comprehensive law
enforcement and intelligence cooperation with
Political commitment defines the
nature and scope of that cooperation. An
internationally unpopular war may make the
necessary commitment more difficult.
At the same time, the diplomatic
imperatives of fighting a war in Iraq may have
bumped terrorist financing down the bilateral
agenda with critical front line states. By all
external indications, the Saudis and other
front line states have not taken sufficient
steps to change the strategic environment that
funds extremism. Appropriate regulation of
charities, hawala and the formal banking
system, along with the reining in of the
madrassa educational system, among other
things, requires a fundamental commitment to
long term structural reform. While laws,
regulations and decrees are difficult to come
by, there is no credible evidence that
comprehensive structural reform is taking
And yet we do not appear to be holding
the Saudis' feet to the fire. Rather than
speaking out loudly and forcefully about their
and other states' failure to take steps
necessary to assure U.S. security, the United
States remains publicly silent on these issues,
no doubt captive to the near term diplomatic
imperatives of waging war, and assuring the
basing and overflight rights, along with the
petroleum production commitments, that are
necessary or desirable in connection with that
Thank you very much.
MR. KEAN: Mr. Dillingham is from
Civil Aviation and General Accounting Office.
MR. DILLINGHAM: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman, Vice Chairman Hamilton,
Members of the Commission, thank you for
inviting GAO to participate in this very
important national forum.
As many of you know, GAO is the
investigative arm of the United States
Congress. Over the years our reports have been
a key source of information about the security
of the nations transportation system.
In June of 2000 we reported that the
terrorist threat of attacks using aircraft was
a persistent and growing concern for the United
States. The report also said that the trend in
terrorism against targets was towards large
scale incidents designed for maximum
destruction, terror and media impact. Fifteen
months later 9/11 happened.
Mr. Chairman, I have submitted a
formal statement, for the record. This morning
I would like to summarize that statement around
two questions. First, how has transportation
security changed since 9/11? And second, where
do we go from here?
Regarding the first question about
changes since September 11. Overall I think
the nation has come a long way. Before 9/11
security was never treated as a national
priority and it had never gotten the kind of
attention or resources that it receives today.
We now have a federal agency whose primary
mission is ensuring security for all modes of
transportation. That agency is the
Transportation Security Administration. TSA is
the largest agency within the new Department of
During the first 18 months of its
existence the primary focus of TSA has been in aviation
security. Before 9/11 the airlines, the
airports and the federal aviation
administration were all in charge of some
aspect of aviation security. Unfortunately, as
is often the case, when everybody is in charge,
no one is really in charge and things can and
did fall through the cracks.
Prior to 9/11 the very critical task
of passenger and baggage screening, what was
referred to as the last line of defense, was
being handled by persons who were not properly
trained, who were not properly supervised,
whose salaries were not even competitive with
the salaries of nearby fast food restaurants,
and who had probably got the job less than six
Now most of the security screeners have been
federalized. The question is whether screening
is better because the staff are now federal
employees. I submit to you that screening
probably is better, but not because workers are
federal employees. Screening is better because
the workers are more skilled, because they are
receiving a decent wage and because they are
getting better training and supervision.
However, I want to point out that the
TSA reports that since it took over screening
they have confiscated literally millions of
prohibited items. I know that you have seen in
the media, earlier on, about knitting needles
and scissors and things of that nature. We are
not talking about those kind of things. We are
talking about over a million knives and box
cutters. We are talking about more than a
Since 9/11 there is a long list of
security initiatives that have been undertaken.
Some of which are classified and some of which
are widely publicized, such as all baggage
being screened before it goes on the aircraft,
the installation of reinforced cockpit doors,
and the presence of thousands of Federal Air
In spite of all that has been
accomplished, there are still vulnerabilities
and occasional lapses in the aviation security
system. The system is far from perfect and a
hundred percent secure. I submit to you that
occasional lapse will probably continue to
occur. The goal should be perfection, but
there should also be a recognition that
perfection is not attainable. The question is,
are we doing as much as practicable to move
towards that goal?
I think for the most part the answer
is yes. With most of the goals that Congress
set for TSA regarding aviation security now
behind them, TSA is in the very early stages of
working with the other transportation modes to
enhance security in those modes.
Unlike the direct and pervasive role
it played with regard to aviation, TSA
envisions serving more as a transportation
system security manager for the other modes.
TSA will establish security standards and
facilitate coordination and collaboration
across the six transportation modes. TSA has
also provided some relatively small amounts of
money to the other modes for security projects.
For the most part, state and local
authorities and the private sector, in
collaboration with a variety of federal
agencies, such as the Coast Guard, Customs and
federal law enforcement agencies, have been
responsible for as much of what has been done
to improve security in the other modes. These
improvements have largely been a few new
security initiatives or increased frequency of
The new initiatives are activities
such as conducting vulnerability assessments, in
establishing first response teams. The
increased frequency type activities includes
things like additional training for emergency
preparedness and revising emergency plans and
conducting emergency drills.
The bottom line is that actions are
being taken and some progress is being made
towards securing the nation's transportation
system. But what could be considered as
constituting an effective overall multi modal
transportation security environment, may very
well be years away.
Turning to our last question. Where
do we go from here and how do we get there?
The nation faces a very difficult and
resource intensive task to secure the
transportation system. I would like to offer
some thoughts and observations of where we need
to go to move closer to the goal.
First, we must recognize that it is
not possible to anticipate and counter every
risk. Priorities must be assigned with time
and money devoted to those threats and hazards
that are best established and most likely to
cause the most harm. In short, we need to plan
and act strategically.
Second, effective coordination must be
established among the many public and private
entities responsible for transportation
Third, terrorists are creative. We
need to address a significant proportion of our
energies to identifying possible new terrorist
risks and threats rather than simply preparing
for the last type of attack that occurred. And
in the final analysis, transportation security,
which is crucial to our nation, it must be
considered in the larger context of other
national priorities and weighed and supported
Mr. Chairman and Members of the
Commission, this is very much a
work in progress and much needs to be done.
The GAO stands ready to help.
Thank you very much.
MR. KEAN: Thank you, Mr. Dillingham. Commissioner Gorelick.
MS. GORELICK: Thank you, Mr.
Chairman. I would like address my first couple
of questions to Inspector General Fine.
First of all, I would like to say we
have a very able and talented public servant in
Glenn Fine. We are very happy to have you here
today, and very pleased that you are doing your
job in the Justice Department.
First question, I understand that the
CIA launched an internal review immediately
after 9/11 of its conduct before 9/11. Did the
Justice Department do the same thing?
MR. FINE: No. The Justice Department
did not do a broad after action report similar
to what you describe with the CIA. Initially
the Justice Department deferred to the Joint
Intelligence Committee which was doing a broad
review that looked at the actions of various
Federal Government agencies, including the
Justice Department and others. After that, it
has deferred to this Commission to do that broad
However, also the Inspector General,
Department of Justice, my office, has done a
series of reviews on national security issues,
some of which I describe in my report in my
written testimony, others on the FBI.
In addition when we have been
confronted with particular issues such as the
Atta and Alshehhi visa issue or change of
application issue, we have done reviews on
that. In June, as I mentioned, of last year at
the request of Director Mueller we launched a
review on how the FBI handled the intelligence
information related to the September 11 attacks.
So we are doing that kind of review. But the
broad after action review similar to the CIA has
not been undertaken by the Justice Department
MS. GORELICK: Thank you. My second
question is this. As I read your report, I see
very different reviews occurring for a
foreigner who wants to come into this country
as a student, depending on what route he takes.
So could you contrast, for example, a
foreigner who wants to come into this country
as a student, but who applies for a visa in a
visa waiver country, comes in as a visitor and
then tries to change his status to a student
status, which would allow him to stay longer,
versus, someone who applies to be a student
from a non waiver country and goes through the
consular process for a student waiver. Could
you describe the two?
MR. FINE: Sure. It is a different
For the student who applies abroad in
his or her own country, they have to show ties
to the country, their own country, and show an
indication that they will return to the country
afterwards. They have to show financial means,
they have to show that they have been accepted
at an accredited school in the United States,
and normally, although not always, they
normally go through an interview process with
consular officer. As a result they get a
student visa. They come to the United States.
They present the visa to the immigration
inspector at the port of entry, and they enter
into the United States and take up studies.
That is a different process than a
foreign student who did not get visa abroad but
who comes to the United States on a visitor
visa or who may come to the United States
without a visa because they are from one of the
28 visa waiver countries. So they enter the
United States either with a visitor visa or
without a visa from a visa waiver country, and
in the United States they then apply to change
their status to student.
In the United States it is largely a
paper process. They fill out the I 589 form.
They show they have been accepted by a school.
They show financial means, and then the INS
adjudicates their status on paper without an
interview. Also, prior to September 11, as we
found in the Atta and Alshehhi case, without
even checks of the database that would show
what their status was when they applied to the
United States. So it is a different process
depending on which route they take.
MS. GORELICK: So if you are clever,
you can figure out a way to come into this
country and stay for a substantial period of
time without anyone ever interviewing you as to
the appropriateness of that occurring?
MR. FINE: It is possible to do that.
MS. GORELICK: Has that changed since
MR. FINE: It has not markedly changed
since September 11, particularly from the visa
MS. GORELICK: Mr. Dillingham, did you
want to add something?
MR. DILLINGHAM: Yes, I did. To the
best of our knowledge, the State Department is
denying student visas to people who want to come in to
study flying in the United States. That, in
fact, has changed.
MS. GORELICK: I'm glad to hear that.
One other general question for you,
Mr. Fine. What is the state of connectivity
between the intelligence community and INS
today, INS either at the Justice Department or
at the Department of Homeland Security? How
much information flows between the Intelligence
Community and those who are guarding our
borders and vice versa?
MR. FINE: Connectivity is better than
it was in the past. Now immigration inspectors
and INS officials do connect through their own
databases, through the interagency or board
information system to State Department
databases, the class database, tip off systems,
and in those databases is intelligence
information provided by intelligence agencies.
In addition, the INS has more direct
contacts with the intelligence agencies through
their Office of Intelligence. However, the
information is often unclassified, often
sometimes vague and not in a particular usable
form, we have been told by some immigration
inspectors. I think that is a critical issue,
that this Commission and the government needs
to look at. The connectivity of information.
The integration of the systems and the ability
to get usable information, usable intelligence
information to the front line employees who
need to use that information to screen people
who come to the United States. Without that it
is an enormously difficult job that they do.
MS. GORELICK: Thank you very much.
MR. KEAN: Mr. Gorton.
MR. GORTON: Mr. Fine, assuming that
in 2001 the INS have been substantially better
funded, maybe twice as much money, and equally
more efficient in carrying on its duties. How
many of the 19 hijackers could have been in the
United States or would have perfectly valid
first entry into the United States, in any
MR. FINE: That actually, I think, is
speculative and I can't really answer that
What we do know is that many of them,
most of them, entered into the United States
with valid visas and the immigration inspectors
did not have any information or intelligence
that would change the outcome of their
inspection of them.
So for that it is hard to say what the
difference would have been had the INS been
better funded or had more information, but I do
think it is an important issue that needs to be
addressed going forward.
MR. GORTON: I take it then that most,
if not all of them, could at least have had a
first entry into the United States as visitors
even if the INS had been much more efficient?
MR. FINE: That's correct, and really
the issue there is the State Department. The
State Department's interviews of them, giving
visas to them, and my understanding is
MR. GORTON: But they wouldn't have
required interviews at all if they were just
coming here first as tourists, would they?
MR. FINE: Pardon me?
MR. GORTON: Would they not have
required interviews at all if they were just
coming here first as tourists?
MR. FINE: From some countries they
would have, yes. From the visa waiver
countries they wouldn't have required
interviews. But many of them came from non
visa waiver countries such as Saudi Arabia and
elsewhere, where they did require interviews.
The Inspector General of the
Department of State has looked at that and from
my understanding of it, has indicated that
there were some gaps in the processing of those
19 terrorists for their visas, but that's an
issue for the State Department's Inspector
MR. GORTON: The question is basically
leading to this. I think you have pointed out
very eloquently, particularly in your written
statement, the INS or any similar agency
doesn't exist simply to keep people out. It
exists in order to let the right people in,
whether they are tourists, full time
immigrants, doing business here, or anything
else. One of your statistics is 500 million
particular contacts at one time or another.
So I guess my question is, how much
can we realistically expect to increase safety
and the exclusion of dangerous aliens simply by
a more efficient bureaucracy or homeland
security agency, and how uch for providing for the safety
of the people of the United States, is on the
laps of Congress perhaps to make different
policies and to make the system less complex
and easier to administer than it is.
Does the Department of Justice have
views on that subject?
MR. FINE: Well, I am not sure I can
speak for the Department of Justice per se, but
I do believe the issues need to be addressed at
all levels. It can't simply be looking at the
INS and the end product of the process, saying all
the onus or burden goes upon them. There does
have to be a look at how to allow the flow of
travellers and commerce across our borders, but
in a way that attempts to screen out ones who
shouldn't be here.
Perhaps through trusted traveller
lanes, or ways to increase the ability of cargo
to be inspected in advance. So that is an
important issue. There are policy issues that
the United States Congress has to look at as
What we have looked at is the INS's
aspect of it and we have found deficiencies. I
am not saying that is the sole problem in
protecting our country.
MR. GORTON: One more question of that
nature, you spoke of the 28 visa waiver
countries in your written testimony, at least.
You speak to the fact that there is a great
deal of theft of passports from those
countries. Of course they are, in a sense,
valid passports. Is there any practical
solution to that problem? Obviously from very
friendly countries a visa waiver is probably a
good policy decision, but how do we prevent the
misuse of visa waiver passports?
MR. FINE: I think there are several
ways to do that. One is to ensure that those
countries have better accountability of their
passports, and if their passports are being
stolen we might want to look to see whether
those countries should remain in the visa
Secondly, once those passports were
stolen they have to be reported so that the
numbers of those passports can be entered into
lookout systems, and when someone travelling
with that passport shows up at a port of entry,
an INS inspector can check the database, see
that it's a stolen passport, see that it is
illegitimate and stop that person.
What we found in our reviews is that
foreign countries sometimes
MR. GORTON: How are we going to
determine whether the passport was stolen?
MR. FINE: By the foreign country
having clear internal controls about passports.
They know they are missing, they know they are
stolen. They report it to the United States.
It is entered into a look out system, and then
we can stop people trying to use those
passports. That's what happens, but we found
that is not happening on a consistent basis and
in come cases the INS inspectors didn't even
check the look out systems to determine whether
the passport had been reported as stolen. That
is one thing that we can do.
MS. GORELICK: Let me follow up on
that and then move to more questions of Mr.
Wolosky and Mr. Dillingham.
The INS, as I understand from your
report and my own experience, has utilized
biometric measures for the identification of
individuals trying to come into this country
which, obviously, are harder to forge than a
passport, and certainly harder to steal.
Do you see a future in the utilization
more broadly of biometric measures as a form of
identity checks at our borders?
MR. FINE: Yes, I do. I think it is
critical. Names can be changed. Names can be
misspelled. Names are not a full enough
identifier. There does need to be some use of
biometrics to ensure that the person showing up
at the border is the person that received the
visa, and also that the person is who he or she
says he is.
So, yes, biometrics are clearly needed
to be incorporated into our identification
MS. GORELICK: Finally, you have
raised serious questions about the visa waiver
program. In your professional opinion, should
that program be continued?
MR. FINE: I think the visa waiver
program does have significant benefits. It is
a policy question whether those benefits
outweigh the costs, and I am not in a position
to say that the program should be discontinued.
But I do think the countries that are in it
should be carefully screened and held
accountable to ensure that the appropriate
measures, that its passports are not being
MR. GORTON: Have we ever picked up a
suspected terrorist who came here on a stolen
passport from a visa waiver country?
MR. FINE: Yes, we have.
MS. GORELICK: I would like to ask Mr.
Dillingham a couple of questions, not just
about aviation security, but as I understand
it, you previously were director of physical
infrastructure issues, generally, at the GAO.
There have been published reports that
the Transportation Security Administration has
poured, in fact, more resources into aviation
security than perhaps we are needing at the
moment. Yet we hear that there is not the same
degree of attention being paid to our ports, to
container shipments, to bridges, to tunnels.
And as you have said, if everyone is in charge,
no one is in charge.
You have contrasted the way in which
TSA is approaching its role in aviation
security with what, I think you have described
as, a more management role setting standards,
creating a collaborative role with all of the
many parties who have responsibilities for all
of these other transportation modes.
Could you comment on whether the
resources are adequate to maintain and increase
our security in these other areas of
transportation, and whether the management
structure that you have described is adequate?
MR. DILLINGHAM: Yes. I think,
without a doubt, there has been
disproportionate resources applied to aviation.
Aviation is different from the rest of the
modes in that there was a Federal, a large
Federal presence associated with aviation prior
to 9/11. It was, of course, the FAA.
The other modes are also different in
their characteristics. Mass transit, for
example, is very hard to secure because of the
nature of it. It's large, it has to be open.
There are lots of ways to get into it.
Ports, a huge undertaking needs to be
done, but there is also this sort of mix of
stakeholders, local, state and federal players
with regard to some of these other modes of
transportation. Clearly, there is a gap
between what has been done for aviation and
what needs to be done for the rest of the
modes. Money is a big issue.
Just by example, we came up from
Washington on the Amtrack. We came through a
very heavily populated northeast corridor, and
to my knowledge there was no metal detector
check. There was no screening to speak of, and
we pulled in under Penn Station.
That could have been a very bad
situation. A situation that occurred in
Baltimore a year or so ago with a chemical fire
on a freight train. All of this points to the
notion that there are definite gaps, whether
there are going to be enough resources to
address that is a real question.
What the TSA is doing now is, trying
to establish what are vulnerabilities
associated with these various modes, and to
move from there.
The management structure you ask
about, I think there is no way that it can be
the same as with aviation. Aviation was
mandated by legislation, so I think the
coordination and the collaboration and the
structure that TSA is trying to put in place
is, in fact, a good first step and it is
probably a logical step to take in terms of
It will still be a case where well
it wouldn't be a case where no one is in
charge. TSA will be in charge by statute.
They are in charge of all transportation
security. They will, therefore, have a
statutory basis to coordinate and for
cooperation and setting standards across the
MS. GORELICK: Well, Mr. Dillingham,
if I might make an observation. Before
September 11, 2001, the GAO and other agencies
made numerous reports about the vulnerability
of our aviation security system. And the
response was often, you need to understand how
disperse power is. There are various entities
with various responsibilities. There are local
transportation authorities. There is the
aviation industry, et cetera, and of course,
this is very costly, and trying to figure out
who bears the burden is very complicated.
That sounds actually quite similar to
what we are hearing now about transportation
outside the aviation security arena. I am
prepared to concede that there is a lot of
complexity, but I wonder whether we have the
same urgency being brought to bear around our
ports, in particular, around container
shipments in particular, around the security of
our bridges and tunnels, and whether you, having
broad experience and lengthy experience in this
area, feel that we have the right level of
effort and the right structure being brought to
MR. DILLINGHAM: I think the process
that is in place is the necessary process.
That is, to determine what's important. This
is all being done on a risk assessment basis,
meaning that the TSA is looking across all
modes trying to see what the vulnerabilities
and the threats are, and then to prioritize
that across all threats and across all modes.
Because, as I said in my statement, there is no
way that we, as a country, can secure against
all risk. So we have to prioritize and we have
to prioritize according to what the threat is
and the likely harm that would come if that
threat is in fact realized.
I think ports are high on the agenda.
Right now, only two percent of the thousands of
containers that come into the country are
physically inspected, but neither the
technology nor the manpower is available to
inspect 100 percent of them. But we are moving
in the direction of getting better technology
and finding ways, both internationally and
domestically to address the issue.
MR. GORTON: Mr. Dillingham, you were
very optimistic about the degree of progress we
have made since 9/11 with respect to air
transportation. First, I just wanted to make
sure, you talked about six modes, have I got
the other five right, car, train, mass transit,
bus and maritime? Would those be the other
MR. DILLINGHAM: Yes, sir.
MR. GORTON: Which of those five is
the highest priority and the greatest threat,
as far as you are concerned, from the point of
view of moving in the direction of the degree
of progress we have made with airlines.
MR. DILLINGHAM: I think ports. I
think maritime because maritime cannot only be
a place of substantial infrastructural damage,
but it can have cascading effects on the
economy. We can see when our ports were closed
for a very short time a few months ago, how
that effected the economy and international
commerce. So I think ports are probably the
next highest priority, and probably highest in
terms of vulnerability as well.
MR. GORTON: One other question, if I
may, both for you and for Mr. Fine.
How would you characterize the
cooperation of the commercial airlines
themselves in connection with air
transportation safety? That question is for
you. And the question for you, Mr. Fine, with
respect to tracking emigrants and immigrants
from the United States?
MR. DILLINGHAM: When you say their
cooperation with regard to safety could you say
more. What do you mean?
MR. GORTON: The whole TSA attempt,
which you characterized as being pretty
successful so far, would you characterize all
or most of the airlines as being highly cooperative
with the safety measures or reluctant from time
MR. DILLINGHAM: I think the airlines
are it is probably both. The airlines, of
course, are in some economic distress. So the
airlines will often sort of push back with
regard to at least paying for some of the
security measures that are being put in place
and they see them as unfunded mandates.
However, the airlines on the other
hand recognize that if the flying public do not
believe that security is much improved, the
flying public will not come back and the
airline industry will suffer even greater
economic woes, which in turn has a cascading
effect on the rest of the economy.
MR. GORTON: How about with tracking
MR. FINE: I think it is mixed. I
don't think that they have been uncooperative.
I do think that there are issues regarding the
collection of departure cards, I 94, and
whether they are universally collected and
provided to the INS. They are clearly not.
There are also issues with regard to
airport facilities, inspection facilities,
ensuring that they are safe and secure.
In the end, though, it is a Government
function to ensure that it is handled
appropriately. I think the onus is on the
federal government to ensure that whatever
needs to be done is done. And I think that's
where the answer lies.
MS. GORELICK: Mr. Wolosky, we had a
witness here yesterday who basically said that
there is so much money, as he put it I think,
"sloshing around" in the Islamic charitable
community, and so relatively little of it is
needed, if you will, to successfully fund
terrorism, that the ability to squeeze out the
part that has been siphoned off to support
terrorism activities is extremely challenging,
let's say. Could you give us your assessment
of that? After all, you said we need to do
that. We need to identify those sources of
funds and eliminate them.
MR. WOLOSKY: Sure. First, I
absolutely think it is true that there is a
very large amount of money as you said, or as
the witness said "sloshing around" through
that system. In part because it is actually
one of the five pillars of Islam, Zacat, to
give at least 2.5 percent of your income to
charitable endeavors. That is collected both
through retail charities, at mosques and Muslim
community centers, and through larger
donations, typically by Gulf Arabs.
But particularly when it is given at
mosques and Muslim community centers, again,
like the mosque across the river, it is
frequently collected by a community leader. It
is co mingled. It is dispersed at the
discretion of the community leader, most
frequently without any record keeping or any
But I don't agree with the premise that
just because a large amount of money moves
through that system that the United States
should not take steps to regulate that activity
within its own borders. Nor do I agree with
the premise the United States should forego
instruments of foreign policy to compel other
states in which this activity occurs to engage
in similar regulatory efforts.
I think that there are really two
reasons to take such action, notwithstanding
the fact that a relatively small amount of
money can contribute to devastating terrorist
The first is that where particular
nodes are identified, you actually can take
steps to prevent attacks from occurring by
choking off the financing.
Secondly, to the extent that you force
systemic changes, you make it harder for
terrorists to raise and move money. To the
extent that you achieve that objective, you are
forcing them to spend more time worrying about
how they are going to raise and move money,
than spending time and effort on planning and
executing deadly attacks.
MS. GORELICK: Thank you for that
response. I think it will help us as we
consider the kind of factual inquiry we need to
be making here.
You raised, I think, two fairly
dispiriting points. One is that the issue of
attacking the sources of terrorism funding has
moved lower on the bilateral foreign policy
agenda. And also, that the necessity for some
international rubric for attacking terrorist
financing has been undermined by the lack of
international consensus for this effort.
I was struck by the fact that in
November of '02, when you did your report, you
actually observed that while immediately in the
aftermath of 9/11 there was a lot of
international cooperation, you said, "that
coalition may be fraying" and you noted a
"widening gap between the U.S. and Europe" on
the basic salience and perimeters of global
My question to you is this, here we
are six months later, how are our requests for
international cooperation in the area of
financing of terrorism being met? How are
other key participants in the international
community currently responding to our request
MR. WOLOSKY: I think with respect to
both questions, unfortunately they are better
posed to someone who is currently working on
these issues on behalf of the United States
Government, but I do think that, as a general
matter, there is substantial evidence to
suggest that our foreign partners you have
to remember, the way this process has worked
insofar as IEEPA designations is concerned, is
that the United States, through executive
order, has named individuals and organizations
that are part of the terrorist financial
network, the assets of which are frozen,
assets subject to U.S. jurisdiction are frozen.
U.S. persons are prohibited by law from
transacting business with those persons or
That process has been
multi lateralized through U.N. Security Council
Resolution 1390 whereby the same names of
individuals or organizations has gone to the
United Nations and gone out to the member
states of United Nations for similar action, as
the member states may wish to engage in.
There have been, in my experience, two
problems with the multi lateralization of that
process. The first is that many states lack
the technical capacity to actually freeze
funds. That was illustrated for me personally
when I visited, in recent months, a
strategically significant African country and I
asked them the question: What happened to this
piece of paper with all these names that came
from the United Nations? Where did it go?
Answer: It went to the Foreign Ministry.
I go to the Foreign Ministry and say,
what did you do with this piece of paper with
all the names on it? Well, we sent it to the
Go to the Central Bank, as I did and
say, what happened to this list? Well, we sent
it to our banks.
Go to the banks, as I did: What
happened to this piece of paper with all the
names? Well, we put it over there because we
don't have any ability to go through our
accounts and identify the beneficial holders of
So that is a point on technical
capacity which needs to be addressed in this
The second point has to do with
differing standards of who and what constitutes
a terrorist, and also the evidentiary standards
with respect to the type of information that
foreign states have asked for in connection
with supporting the U.S. designations.
With respect to the first subpoint, as
the report of the Council on Foreign Relations
notes, the European Union still to this day
permits Hamas and Hizbollah to legally raise
funds on its territory.
Secondly, with respect to evidentiary
standards, what we have found post 9/11 was
that while there was initial willingness of
other states to freeze funds over designated
individuals and organizations originated by the
U.S. Government, that willingness faded as the
months went on and foreign states asked for
increasingly sensitive intelligence information
that supported the original U.S. designations,
which when it wasn't provided caused them to
fail to take steps to freeze the accounts of
designated individuals and organizations.
MR. GORTON: Mr Wolosky, would you
give us a brief description of how the Hawala
system works. What kind of financial system is
And secondly, what the United States
has done with respect to its illegitimate use
for the support of terrorism when the deposits
originate here in the United States.
And third, whether there is really
anything we can do with respect to such an
informal system when the transactions take
place entirely overseas.
MR. WOLOSKY: Sure. The way it works
is essentially as follows.
Let's assume that I am a Pakistani
immigrant living in Brooklyn and wish to
transfer $500 to my parents living in
Islamabad. The way I can use the Hawala system
to accomplish that money transfer is by going
to a local individual, a hawaladar in Brooklyn,
giving him my $500. He uses his network, which
is most frequently a clan or family based
network and contacts his counterpart in
Islamabad, and he says, when someone comes in
with a particular identifying code, give him
That system enables money to be moved
without the physical movement of money
MR. GORTON: Is not that individual in
Brooklyn engaged in banking activities under
the laws of New York?
MR. WOLOSKY: Well, until recently the
problem has been that there has been no Federal
regulation of that activity. Post 9/11, using
preexisting legal authorities, the Department
of the Treasury has begun to require that
activity, individuals who engage in that
activity to register.
MR. GORTON: I see.
MR. WOLOSKY: Because the activity
fundamentally is intended to be anonymous,
without record keeping, without paper trails.
The likelihood that the individuals will
register is quite remote.
But notwithstanding that fact, it
provides a basis for prosecution in Federal
court if they fail to register. Prior to 9/11
frequently there was no basis for prosecution
in Federal court. Now if they fail to
register, they can be prosecuted.
MR. GORTON: Is that effectively our
method of stopping some portion of that $500
from going, not to the parent in Islamabad, but
MR. WOLOSKY: Yes. I think a basic
point which you alluded to is that this system
of moving money is used for mainly legitimate
purposes. It is unique to several different
cultures in south Asia and east Asia. It has
been used for centuries. It is used by
terrorists and other criminals, but it is also
used by a lot of people who just want to move
money and avoid formal banking. They have
access to formal financial systems, but they
want to avoid it, for whatever reasons.
But you asked whether that was the
primary method of regulating this activity in
the United States. I believe that it is,
through a registration system.
And you also asked whether it what
steps or whether the United States should take
action to prevent other countries from being
part of abuses of this system.
I think the answer is yes. Again, if
you look under Title 3 of the U.S.A. Patriot
Act, it authorizes the Executive Branch to
restrict or prohibit access to the U.S. financial
system on the part of states or foreign
financial institutions that lack adequate
anti money laundering regimes.
This is ultimately the most powerful
tool in the arsenal of the U.S. Government.
It has not and it provides leverage over
states that, for instance, refuse to regulate
in any manner the Hawala system.
It hasn't really been used to this
point in this context and the findings of the
distinguished Bipartisan Commission and the
Council on Foreign Relations was that it
MR. GORTON: One follow up question.
You may have left out the middle of this
transaction. Your Pakistani has gone and given
$500 to the Hawala person in Brooklyn who has then
called Islamabad or communicated with
Islamabad, which gives $500 to the parent
there, but somehow or other the $500 has still
got to get from Brooklyn to Islamabad, does it
MR. WOLOSKY: No. It doesn't. That's
how the system works.
In other words, it is credited through
family relationship, let's say, or a clan based
relationship. The money itself physically does
If you, for instance, if your uncle
called you and asked you to loan some $500 to
someone who he wanted you to loan the money to,
you probably would do it, even if he didn't
advance you the $500. You would rely on the
fact of your family relationship for settlement
to occur in the manner of your choosing, at
some future day. That is exactly how the
Hawala system works.
MS. GORELICK: There would be an
off setting transaction at some point in the
MR. WOLOSKY: At some point in the
future. Again, at a time of convenience,
whatever the circumstances may require. It
doesn't have to be in cash. It could be in
gold or it could be through some co mingled
account in an Islamic bank. It can occur in a
variety of different ways.
MS. GORELICK: One of the challenges
for this Commission is to look at
organizational issues and to make sure, A, our
Government is arrayed correctly and organized
correctly and, B, that it is using all of its
The Council on Foreign Relations
report and your testimony note, a lack of
organizational accountability for the money
laundering issue. You made a number of
recommendations with regard to who should have
the leadership and who should have the ultimate
Since that report was issued, can you
describe what, if anything, has been done to
address the organizational problems that you
identified, and could you describe briefly
those organizational deficiencies?
MR. WOLOSKY: Sure. The report
suggested that notwithstanding the significance
of this issue, the fundamental significance of
this issue, there was no single U.S. official
with the correct mandate and authority to
coordinate U.S. policy on terrorist financing
issues. Policy is currently coordinated
through a policy coordination committee that is
headed by the General Council of the Treasury
The Bipartisan Commission of the
Council on Foreign Relations concluded that
that, for a variety of reasons, was not the
most effective way to coordinate various
diplomatic, intelligence and law enforcement
and regulatory ingredients that contribute to
effective and sustained U.S. policy response.
For one thing, the report of the
Council on Foreign Relations concluded that the
Treasury Department was not the appropriate
agency to coordinate diplomatic or intelligence
There is also the question as to
whether or not even the most capable General
Counsel of the Treasury and I don't know the
General Counsel of the Treasury, but I am told
that he is extraordinarily competent given
his other statutory and institution responsibilities,
has other things to worry about than the
suppression of terrorist financing.
MS. GORELICK: I take it from your
report, though, that the Congress has vested
this responsibility in the Treasury Department
and other agencies of Government have resisted
implementing that; is that correct?
MR. WOLOSKY: I think that the
Executive Bank has vested this responsibility
in the Treasury Department. There is no
statutory authority whatsoever with respect to
Our report concluded that because of
the very different and difficult ingredients
that contribute to an effective response,
ranging from diplomatic activities to
intelligence activities to regulatory
activities, that that was best coordinated out
of the White House.
MS. GORELICK: An organizational
question for you, Mr. Fine.
You have noted that a very substantial
portion of the immigration and naturalization
service responsibilities that are the subject
of your reports, have now been transferred to
the Department of Homeland Security.
Your office has evidently built up a
tremendous amount of expertise in the review
and oversight of those functions. Has all of
that capacity in your office been transferred
to the Department of Homeland Security so that
that oversight can continue uninterrupted in
that new department?
MR. FINE: All of our capacity has not
been transferred, but we have transferred a
portion of our capacity.
There is a Department of Homeland
Security, Office of the Inspector General that
has been created. It has been created with
resources from various entities. We have
provided resources to it. The Department of
Treasury Inspector General's Office has
provided resources to it. The Department of
Transportation Inspector General's Office has
provided resources, FEMA and others. So there
is a newly developed Department of Homeland Security,
OIG. We have provided investigators and some
managers to that entity.
A lot of our capacity is involved with
the INS, but it is also involved with the FBI,
the DEA, the Marshal Service. So there is not a
distinct unit that we could transfer over
I do think it is a critical issue that
you raised, though, because I do think that is
it is critically important that there be
adequate, aggressive and strong oversight over
this new entity, ranging from the INS to the
Customs Service, to the Secret Service to the
TSA. It is going to be a daunting challenge
for that new agency, the Department of Homeland
Security OIG, to get up and running, and to
ensure that there is continuity of oversight.
We believe strongly in it and we think
that that new OIG ought to be adequately funded
to perform its mission in an aggressive way.
MR. HAMILTON: Mr. Wolosky, well,
first of all let me say, this has been a
marvelous panel. Each of the three of you
have been very helpful to the Commission and we
Mr. Wolosky, I was focused on your
final paragraph. "We don't hold the Saudis
feet to the fire."
I gather from your testimony that we,
the United States, and the countries that are
most responsible here, if we had the political
will to crack down on financing, we could do
it. But, because of policy considerations that
are very important, we don't do it.
We have to have the oil. We have to
have the overflight rights. We have to have
the basing rights. And because we have to have
those things, we do not hold their feet to the
fire. Is that your view?
MR. WOLOSKY: That is my view.
Unfortunately, I wasn't called before you to
testify on policy with regard to Saudi Arabia
in the current context of
MR. HAMILTON: I know, I appreciate
that. I am not being critical of you in any
way. It is just a very good illustration of
how policy gets in the way of, in this case,
MR. WOLOSKY: Yes. That's the point
of my testimony. In other words, I am not here
to make judgments of whether or not particular
issues should be prioritized over other issues,
but what I can tell you is that the United
States, at the highest levels, has not spoken
out loudly and forcefully on the terrorist
financing issue as it relates to Saudi Arabia.
That is not to say that things aren't being
done. I have every reason to believe that a
lot is being done, but it is being done in the
shadows. The conclusion of the Council of
Foreign Relations' report was that it was time
to bring it out of the shadows. For the
President of the United States or for other
senior officials to state clearly,
unequivocally and unambiguously what was
required of the Saudi Government on the
terrorist financing issue.
That is not being done, and in the
judgment of this task force it needed to be
done in order to set benchmarks for the Saudis
and to enable the Saudi Government to
communicate to its own citizens what kind of
conduct was and was not acceptable.
MR. THOMPSON: Mr. Dillingham, I don't
want to sound like a cranky business traveller,
but I would like to get into an area of focus
on the part of TSA in terms of air travel
security, because funding follows focus, as we
know, and your testimony and that of Mr. Fine
this morning, have pointed out some rather
large funding gaps, particularly with regard to
port security which you testified to, and the
issue of water security that Mr. Fine testified
I acknowledge that TSA employees, the
new ones especially, are finding and retrieving
large amounts of weapons. But if news stories
are to be credited, some weapons still get
through. I understand it is a system which
depends not just on technology, but on human
instinct and humans paying attention as well.
But it seems to me that a fault of government
is it fights yesterday's battles.
As I go through airline security
screening processes, I see this sort of almost
obsessive focus on belts, and shoes. And at
the same time you are telling me that
containers are coming into the United States
inspected only at the level of 2 percent, if
that. And Mr. Fine is telling me that the
northern border is, in many respects, an
unprotected area, particularly with regard to
24/7 coverage. While everybody is down in the
Southwest trying to prevent undocumented
workers from crossing the border to work in the
United States and take jobs that Americans
Is our focus on airline security
wrong? Who makes these policies? Who reviews
these policies? How are they kept up to date?
Are we anticipating ways in which terrorists
can use airline vulnerability, or are we saying
that because Richard Reid got on an airplane
and tried to light his shoes, that we are going
to focus on shoes of millions and millions of
American business travellers. And for the life
of me, maybe you can explain it, but I don't
see the relevance of showing your belt buckle
open as opposed to your belt buckle closed, and
yet we have these jam ups at the security
system screening depots with people milling
around. We have all seen this process.
Is this the right balance? Is there
somebody sitting in Washington to say, well,
let's look at what we are doing about airline
security and try and anticipate future attacks?
MR. DILLINGHAM: Yes, Governor, if I
I think it is part of, if you have
only got a hammer, all of the answers you use
that hammer for. That's sort of how aviation
security has evolved. That was the first thing
that came out of the box and we have applied
all of our resources to it.
It may seem if I can give you just
sort of a story behind the belt buckle. What
has been determined is that before 9/11 people
would the belt buckle would send off an
alarm and the screener would pass by and say,
okay, belt buckle, no problem.
But the process of testing the system,
if you have a belt buckle and you can hide a
weapon inside or behind that belt buckle, and
it is only passed as, it is only a buckle, it
is not a weapon. That's the kind of situation
that they were focusing on.
It is the same thing with people at
airports. They see grandmothers and children
being examined and it seems embarrassing, in
fact it can be, but they also have intelligence
to say that the terrorists have used these kind
of ways to get things through.
We are now seeing a ratcheting back of
the things that don't make sense. We are
seeing a rationalization of security. You are
no longer asked did you pack your bag, has it
been with you the whole time. There is no
longer the prohibition of driving up to the
We are seeing ratcheting back. We are
seeing a rationalization of it. So there is
someone who is looking at this. After 9/11 it
was, let's do everything that we can to change
the situation for aviation security, and now
there are changes.
You are right, that has been the
reputation of security in this country,
fighting the last battle and not looking for
what's coming. I can tell you that our office
is looking at that issue and trying to
understand, you know, to what extent are we
looking for the next generation of technology.
To what extent are we moving beyond where we
were being prepared for the threats that we
haven't seen yet, but we know were out there.
MR. THOMPSON: Mr. Fine, going back to
the students for the moment. Do we have a
rough idea how many students are in the United
States at any one particular time?
MR. FINE: About half a million.
MR. THOMPSON: Have a million?
MR. FINE: Yes.
MR. THOMPSON: I noticed all the way
through you written testimony, and a little bit
in your oral testimony as well, that almost
every system that we have developed or
identified to deal with some of the issues
about student entry or student remainder or
student registration, don't yet seem to be
working or up to snuff. I mean, is the shear
number of foreign students in the United States
at any one time going to overwhelm any system?
MR. FINE: It clearly overwhelmed the
paper based system which was antiquated and
inefficient. A computer based system I am not
sure will overwhelm the ability of the system
to track who is in the country, who is not in
the country, who has shown up at school, who
had has gotten a student visa, came to the
United States and then never showed up in the
school, as actually one of the September 11
hijackers did. He got a visa to show up at a
language school, never showed up. The school
didn't do anything about it and none of the
authorities knew this.
So we need a system that tracks that
and can provide that information. What is
going to be very difficult is what to do with
that information and how to decide what is the
important ones to follow through with and how
to prioritize what happens with an enormous
amount of information. For that, I think,
there needs to be intelligence and adequate
intelligence to determine where the threats are.
But in the first step there does have
to be a system, a computerized system that does
track the status of the students. I believe
that the SEVIS system that is being implemented
is a good system and has the potential to do
it, it is just simply not fully implemented and
needs more steps to go.
MR. THOMPSON: Assuming the systems
work, can we ever hire enough people to
follow up on the information in the system and
go track the people down who disappear from the
system? To me that is a really devilish
MR. FINE: I don't think you can hire
enough people to track all of them, but I think
you can do some efforts with some issues where
there is intelligence that indicates you need to.
It is also important to be able to
provide information from that system to other
law enforcement agencies, so that when other
law enforcement agencies come in contact with
somebody, they will know that this is a person
out of status, this is a student who never
showed up at school. So they have that
information and can act upon it. Prior to this
computerized system, there was no possibility
MR. THOMPSON: Could you or Mr.
Dillingham comment on the status of the
technology or efforts, pilot programs, or
anything else that is out there to prescreen
business travellers on airlines, or prescreen
workers who come into the United States during
the course of day and go back to their host
country in the evening.
It seems to me we haven't made much
progress there and the result is, I presume,
that we are still using a lot of human
resources to screen the same people
day in day out that present what you presume to
be a low security risk. Are there enough
people to guard our northern border?
MR. FINE: Those are important
projects. There are some projects that provide
trusted travellers access across the border.
They are not universally available. I believe
that is an issue that needs to be addressed and
needs to be more widely used.
Part of the issue is the money.
Sometimes the fees are higher than people want
to pay. But it is a program that I think
provides some relief from the crushing workload
that inspectors have along the border, an
ability to speed some people up and allow
greater scrutiny of others.
MR. THOMPSON: The technology is there,
MR. FINE: Yes.
MR. DILLINGHAM: Yes. Following what
Mr. Fine said, the TSA is in fact looking at
programs such as trusted travellers, starting
with identifying, using identification with
biometrics for all transportation workers. So
that is in process.
And at an international level, I think
it is one of the unresolved issues. There is
some cooperation between other countries and
the United States in terms of supplying
passenger lists for international travellers
ahead of time. That is one of the issues that
needs to be further explored. Bilateral,
multilateral agreements with regard to security
and security operations between the United
States and other countries. It is clearly an
MR. KEAN: I have one question and
then Commissioner Ben Veniste and Commissioner
I think I read about a year ago for the first time that
the greatest danger out there was probably
containers, and containers in container ports.
You said practically the same thing again today
and I read it a number of times in between.
You said, well the technology has got to be
Can you give us any kind of
approximate timetable when that kind of danger
is going to be lessened or are we just going to
live with it?
MR. DILLINGHAM: We are certainly
going to live with it for a while. There are
some technologies out there that can be used.
What's missing right now is better technology
and also the balance between screening and
moving cargo. There are ways in which you can
x ray these containers, you can physically
inspect these containers, but what you are
talking about is slowing the commercial
process. That is where the balance has to be
Technologies are, in fact, being
developed. In some cases the technology is so
expensive at this point that it is also not
being readily accepted by the maritime
MR. KEAN: Is there any kind of a
timetable, six months a year, two years?
MR. DILLINGHAM: I would go with
multiple years. Not six months, not a year,
but a few years.
MR. THOMPSON: What do other countries
MR. DILLINGHAM: They are petty much
in the same way. Those are the containers that
are coming here. What we have now is we are
trying to work with other countries to do some
screening, some random screening of containers
at their point of origin so there is less to be
concerned about as they arrive on U.S. shores,
but it is an international issue. It is an
international issue, so they aren't doing any more
than we are doing.
You will find, for example, in an
aviation context, El Al does a lot more with
containers that are going on board and cargo
that is going on board than the U.S. does. But
the thing about that is, it is such a small
operation compared to what we do in the States
that it is not even comparable almost.
MR. KEAN: Commissioner Ben Veniste.
MR. BEN VENISTE: Thank you. Mr.
Fine, I want to express our appreciation for
your offer of complete cooperation with this
Commission. We will definitely take you up on
In the limited time we have available,
it is imperative that we take advantage of the
pre existing work that has been done in order
to identify what needs to be done further and
to make recommendations to the Congress and the
I want to mention, yesterday Mr.
Wolosky, we had a panel that included Professor
Ranstorp and Brian Jenkins who spoke about the
galvanizing effect of 9/11 on the cooperation
of international intelligence agencies with our
own in connection with the anti terrorism
You have made a very provocative
statement with respect to the potential for
degrading that cooperative effort as the result
of political differences relating to the war in
Iraq. Do you have any concrete evidence or
information to suggest that the multilateral
intelligence services have in any way slacked
off from their cooperation with our
intelligence community in that respect?
MR. WOLOSKY: No, I don't. But I can
tell you that having worked these issues
day in day out, they are very difficult under
the best of circumstances. What I fear is that
we may be entering into the worst of
circumstances with respect to our efforts to
cooperate with states that disagree with U.S.
policies in Iraq, which I happen to support.
But my point is that it may be
increasingly difficult for moderate Arab
regimes, and even our traditional allies, to
continue to engage in the type of cooperation
that, I agree, was unprecedented following
MR. BEN VENISTE: So your observation
is one based on informed speculation rather
than actual evidence?
MR. WOLOSKY: Correct.
MR. BEN VENISTE: Let me ask just one
other question of Mr. Fine and Mr. Dillingham.
We have heard about the potential for the
trusted traveller card, perhaps utilizing
Is this the precursor, is this the
camel's nose under the tent for a national
identity card utilizing such information?
MR. FINE: I don't believe it is the
camel under the tent. It is an option for
people to undertake if they want to go quickly
across the border. It is a voluntary thing
that people can participate in or not
participate in if they want to.
I think there are clear benefits to
it, to them and to the system to allow certain
people who have been prescreened to go across
the border quickly.
MR. DILLINGHAM: I would agree. I
wouldn't say that it is the nose under the
tent, but I would want to point out that as far
an as transportation is concerned, this does
not mean that passengers or persons would not
be subject to screening. They would still go
through a screening process. It means that
they would not necessarily have that second
screening at the gate. Again, I agree that it
is a voluntary process.
Right now transportation is developing
what's called a Computer Assisted Passenger
Profiling System, CAPS, which is based on
information about the passenger that allows
them to be sort of placed in the various
categories of screening. Almost like our
national terrorist alert sort of thing, red,
green, yellow in terms of degree of screening.
At the end of that flight, that information is
purged and not kept. There is clearly civil
liberties and privacy issues and organizations
looking at that.
We think that it is a way to make our
system more efficient and focus our resources
on those places where they need to be focused,
finite resources for security.
MR. KEAN: Okay we have to move on
with Commissioner Lehman, Commissioner Fielding
and Commissioner Roemer who have suggested that
they would like to ask brief questions, I hope.
MR. LEHMAN: I have two brief
questions for Mr. Dillingham.
First, while little old ladies are
being frisked at La Guardia, it is possible for
an Arab businessman to pick up the phone and
make a call an go up to Whiteplains and charter
a Gulfstream or 737 Boeing executive jet which
have no reinforced doors, no armed pilots and
no screening for him and his party to go
Are there any plans to do anything
about this rather huge lacuna in our civil
MR. DILLINGHAM: Yes, Mr. Secretary.
We have pointed out that charter flights,
general aviation, cargo, these are still
significant gaps in security and they, in fact,
have to be addressed. It is a matter of
priorities and funding.
Almost any aircraft can be a weapon.
I mean, we saw in the Florida case where just a
general aviation aircraft was stolen and flown
into a building. That could have very well
been an aircraft that had some chemical
biological agents on it as well.
The point is, the threats and the
vulnerabilities are everywhere.
MR. LEHMAN: Yes, but this one is so
obvious, what is taking so long? Here we are a
long time after 9/11 and nothing has been done,
I can assure you, because I use these planes
fairly frequently and I have never seen a touch
MR. DILLINGHAM: It is recognized. We
keep pointing it out, but we can't make them do
it. Hopefully the Commission will point this
out, as well, as one of the gaps and that is a
gap that needs to be addressed.
MR. LEHMAN: I would say it is a
fairly urgent and glaring one considering the
urgency that has been applied to some other
sectors. Anyway, enough said.
The other question I have, as a
veteran of the Reagan Administration, I
participated in a major crisis effort to
increase airline security after several
hijackings in the early days of the Reagan
Administration. I recall that a U.S. marshal
program was put into effect at that time with
great urgency. I also recall that there was an
edict put out, to put reinforced doors and to
see that the pilots that the door were kept
closed throughout the flight and that only the
pilot had the key.
What ever happened to those programs?
MR. DILLINGHAM: Unfortunately, the
history has been when the particular event
leaves the headlines, the follow through has
not always been what we would want it to be,
and that's the case with many of the
recommendations that took place after Pan Am 103,
after the TWA 800. We have 9/11 and we have a
situation where the Federal Air Marshal Service
went from less than thirty or less than a hundred, to several thousand within a
short period of time. We have a situation
where the recommendation that you made early on
about cockpit doors being locked and so forth,
that now some 10, 15 years later we now have,
as a result of 9/11, we have 80 percent of the
fleet with doors installed and the deadline
being at the end of the week for all of the
It's the nature of where we have been,
as long as there is oversight and constant
reinforcement that these things must be done,
the more likely that they will, in fact, be
MR. KEAN: Commissioner Fielding.
MR. FIELDING: Thank you. I have two
quick questions to you, Mr. Dillingham.
First of all, I guess as a cranky
flyer I ought to tell you that I think the TSA
people are a vast improvement and are obviously
trained in attitude as well, and I applaud you
You gave us the list of priorities, of
vulnerability priorities, and I understand air
and then maritime, but for our planning
purposes could you go a little further down the
MR. DILLINGHAM: I think the next one
on the list would be mass transit, freight rail
would follow that. The reason I say mass
transit is because so many persons use mass
transit and an incident on mass transit would
have not only disastrous human effect, but the
psychology of that would also be tremendous.
Rail, it's hard to prioritize too much
because a chemical biological accident
associated with rail has both the human
dimension as well as the psychological
dimension. So it is in that order I would go,
aviation, maritime mass transit, rail.
Now, having said that, more people
ride the bus than many of these modes combined,
but it is the incident. I mean, the likelihood
of you going to do damage to enough buses at
one point in time as opposed to what would
happen in mass transit, as we saw in the Japan
incident, it is different. So it's the
greatest harm to the greatest number of people
is part of the decision about where things
MR. FIELDING: Thank you, the other
thing is just to follow up on what Secretary
Lehman asked you.
Your answer to light aircraft issue,
which has boggled everybody's mind who has ever
been around those, is "you can't make them do
it." Who is "them"?
MR. DILLINGHAM: Well, you can make
recommendations and usually our recommendations
will go to the U.S. Congress. We make
recommendations to the agencies who in turn are
responsive to the U.S. Congress. So it has to
be a congressional priority that is followed
through, and often times I think someone
mentioned today, that action goes
where the money goes.
It is not for us to sort of make
policies. It is for us to present the
information to the policy makers, and from
there, they can make them do it.
MR. FIELDING: How about the Executive
MR. DILLINGHAM: Those are the people
that we generally are saying need to do
something. We are a congressional agency and
our mission is oversight, generally, of the
I don't want to sound like they don't
do anything, but generally the implementation
is not the way we want it to be. Some of the
recommendations that have been made about
aviation have been around for years. They were
either not implemented or partially
After 9/11 there was a new urgency to
it. We have been talking about screeners not
doing what they are supposed to do for 15
MR. FIELDING: Thank you. Thank you, Mr.
MR. KEAN: Last question for
MR. ROEMER: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I too want to join in applauding the help that
this particular panel has been to the
I want to ask Mr. Fine, having been on
the Education Committee for 12 years in
Congress and having sat through many oversight
hearings of SEVIS and heard time and time and
time again that we couldn't implement the
program, it would be another year, it would be
another year. We are experiencing this program
problem and that problem.
When is this finally going to be ready
to be fully implemented and working in our
MR. FINE: Well, it has been
implemented. There is the SEVIS system
available. It applies to new students now.
There are clearly bugs in it, there are clearly
problems with it, but I believe the INS has
made significant progress in implementing the
We have pointed out where deficiencies
are. They need to address those deficiencies.
Come August, they say that it will apply to
every student, not solely the new students but
also the continuing students. So according to
their schedule, by August of this year the
SEVIS system will be up, running, available and
we hope will be adequately followed through
with all the things that need to be done to
ensure that is fully implemented as well.
MR. ROEMER: You have confidence that
that deadline is going to be reached?
MR. FINE: I wouldn't say with
confidence that it is going to be reached,
because I have seen similar things that you have
seen. What I will say is, they have made
progress and they need to make more progress.
MR. ROEMER: Mr. Wolosky, one quick
question for you.
With respect to Saudi Arabia and the
efforts they are making internally and
bilaterally with the United States to do more
about cracking down on the financing of
contributions to terrorist operations, how
would you measure the lack of progress since
9/11 internally? What have they done
internally to crack down? And secondly, externally and
bilaterally with the United States? In
addition to elevating this to the highest
levels of concern for us, what other steps need
to be taken to make this communication more of
a priority in terms of benchmarks and
MR. WOLOSKY: Sure. Well, in
assessing what has been done I think it is
helpful to distinguish, again, between tactical
measures and strategic measures.
The tactical measures are, again, ones
that target particular nodes of the terrorist
financing infrastructure, particular
individuals, particular charities, et cetera.
Much of that activity is conducted by
law enforcement intelligence agencies. Much of
it is not transparent and should remain not
There has been a substantial amount of
activity, as I understand it, between the
United States Government and the Saudi
Government at the tactical law enforcement and
At the same time, there have been
indications that there are problems, chiefly,
with respect to the two public designations
that were made of organizations or individuals
that support terror. Jointly, I mean joint
designations under the IEEPA statute with the
Saudi Government, there were two last year.
One targeted the Al Aman charity and the
other was targeting an individual who was
identified by the Treasury Department as a
significant contributor-one of the cofounders
of al Qaeda is what I believe the Treasury
press release said.
Now, with respect to Al Aman the
problems are published reports that it is still
in business with respect to the individual who
is identified in September and designated by
U.S. Government. The problem is that in the
days after his designation by the U.S.
Government, the designation was questioned by
senior Saudi officials.
So that indicates to me, at least,
that notwithstanding substantial efforts, there
are still problems at the tactical level in
identifying particular nodes within terrorist
financial system with Saudi Arabia.
Now, at the strategic level, there you
get into questions of regulation of charities,
steps that are taken or avoided with respect to
putting in place, know your customer rules and
suspicious activity reporting requirements
within Saudi financial institutions.
Regulations of charities, like hawala, things
of that sort.
Again, that information should be
publicly available. It should be available to
this Commission. It should be available to the
United States Government. It should be
available to me as a concerned private citizen
when I log onto the web. At least with respect
to my efforts, I haven't been able to find it.
MR. ROEMER: Thank you.
MR. KEAN: Thank you very much. This
has been a very, very helpful panel. I hope we
can come back to some of you again. Thank you very
much for your help.
MR. KEAN: The next panel consists of
Michael Wermuth of RAND Corporation, Steven
Brill, author of a book many of us have read,
"After: How America Confronted the September 12
Era." Zoe Baird of the Markle Foundation, and
Randy Larsen of ANSER Institute for Homeland
And I know, Mr. Brill, you have a hard
and fast deadline, so maybe if with start off
with you, sir.
MR. BRILL: Thank you very much,
Governor. I appreciate your accommodating me.
I am delighted to be here this morning
and honored to be asked to share some of my
views with you. I think the primary benefit
that I might be able to offer the Committee,
which is something less than the expertise of
the witnesses you have just heard, is that for
the last year and a half I travelled this
country, trying to get a grip on all of the
questions you have been dealing with and, in
particular, the questions you were dealing with
I spoke at great length not only to
the people at the top of the issues, Attorney
General Ashcroft, Secretary Ridge, Bob Bonnard,
Jim Loy and people like that, and their staffs,
but also to the people who are actually out in
the field trying to implement and make sense of
what was going on in Washington during some
very difficult times.
My goal was to make a connection
between policy, between discussions like the
ones we are having today and what was actually
happening in the airports, at the docks, at the
What I found, I think I can keep my
remarks fairly brief and I hope quite simple,
really falls much more under the category of
what we can go do going forward as opposed to
mistakes we might have made in the past. But I
did come across some of those mistakes that we
made in the past.
First, one general observation that I
suspect everyone in this room shares and I
really got to see firsthand in, I think, a very
special way, we are the people out there
doing this job, are, I think, the worthy
successors to the greatest generation that Tom
Broker wrote about. They are people in
Customs, in INS, in the Coast Guards, of
course, men and women overseas who have really
risen to the challenges of, what I call, the
September 12 Era.
The issue is what kind of support
those people are going to get. Their
dedication is constant. Their attention spans
are long. I sat in on meetings of people who
have been dealing with the container, the cargo
container security issue, who have been dealing
with this issue for 10, 11, 12 years or 20
years. I have sat in on meetings where the
Office of Homeland Security brought people
together for the first time from the Department
of Transportation, from Customs, the Coast
Guard, from Treasury, the Department of State,
to deal with the problem like container
security, or deal with the problem like
borders, and they were delighted to meet each
other. They had all been working off in their
corners in different places dedicated to those
Their attention span is long. I can't
say the same, with all respect, to many of you
on this panel from members of Congress, from
members of Executive Branch and certainly from
members of the press. Their attention spans are
quite something else.
First, let me just recount a couple of
the obvious pre 9/11 mistakes that I
encountered. One was that on the evening of
September 11, airline executives started to get
a fax from the FAA. The FAA's fax was, guess
what, a watch list, a no fly list. Don't let
these 300 people fly. This is the evening of
Airline executives had the same
reaction that I suspect you had: 'it is too bad
we didn't get this the morning of September 11.'
There are 300 names on that list. That list
had been sitting around. It had been provided
both by the CIA and the FBI to the head of
Civil Security at the FAA, and they hadn't yet
developed over a period of months a protocol
for how to add names or subtract names from the
list, and under whose letterhead it was going
to be issued, so they hadn't issued it. The
evening of September 11, they decided to issue
The second story that I think
illustrates the lack of urgency. On the
northern border, this is something that
Inspector General Fine has reported on more
times than you are ever going to have hearings.
On the northern border they were two border
patrol agents who in 1999 testified before
Congress about something called the "catch and
release program." Here is what the "catch and
release program" is.
They would catch people sneaking over
the border in Detroit, walking through the
train tunnel or coming in on little boats on
the shore. They would catch them and then what
they would do is, they would give them a
self addressed postcard. And they would hand
them the card after they caught them and
arrested them. They would hand them this card
and say, 'listen, when you get an address in the
United States, the country you are sneaking
into, that you are not supposed to be in, when
you establish an address, send us back this
postcard. Then we will know your address, and
then we can mail you a notice of your
deportation hearing. Then you can come for a
hearing, and then we can deport you.' A lot of
these people didn't really show up for
deportation hearing or send the postcards back.
They testified about it in 1999. What
happens in October of 2001 I am sorry, not
October, the week after September 11, 2001?
They tell a reporter for the Detroit Free Press
something less than what I have just told you.
Much less in detail, that the northern border
isn't secure. That we don't have the
resources. We can't hold people in detention
when we catch them. Guess what happens to them.
They get a notice that they are going to be
Luckily, the Inspector General stepped
in. The office of, I think it is the Special
Counsel Office that protects whistle blowers,
stepped in. They did not get fired, but that
was the INS border patrol reaction.
That policy after there was yet
another hearing in November of 2001, that
policy has now been changed somewhat. But this
took September 11. It took an Inspector
General. It took some reports in the Detroit
Free Press before that policy talk about
obvious gaps such as the general aviation gap,
this is a fairly obvious gap.
One more example, just before the
millennium there was a very well publicized
arrest of someone who was attempting to sneak
in over the northern border in Washington
State, who had plans to blow up Los Angles
Ray Kelly, who was then the Customs
Director, thought that as a result of that,
this was a good time to reinforce the northern
border with as many customs agents as he could
possibly send there. His attitude, as I
recount in the book was, I will send them there
and surely Congress will pay for it now that we
have made the arrest. Surely the issue of the
budget to protect the northern border going to
be solved by this obvious manifestation of the
crisis, and those extra agents lasted for a few
months. Congress lost interest, it went back
to being just the way it was.
The air marshals just one more
point. On the September 11, the air marshals,
there was 31 U.S. air marshals in the United
States of America, none of them were on a
single airplane on the morning of September 11.
There are now, their target is something
upwards of 3,000, I think, now, and we are
doing it urgently, and, I guess that's good.
But today as we speak the attention
span is still mixed. It still takes the INS,
they say, five to seven months to render an
environmental impact statement before they can
put a pole up that will hold a camera at a
strategic point on the northern border, or to
put motion detectors. They have to do
environmental impact statements, five to seven
months in an administration that is not
otherwise really quite that well known for its
sensitivity to the environment.
The dilemma of all this is I could sit
here for two or three hours as could the other
members of this panel and talk about the gaps.
The really serious issue is that we can never
really be doing enough. We can all trade
anecdotes and we can all decide that we are not
doing enough, and we really cannot do enough in
a country that has 7500 miles of border, that
has thousands of miles of natural gas
pipelines, tens of thousands of facilities
storing or shipping dangerous chemical,
infinite entrances to subways, to trains and to
office buildings, and just as many
vulnerabilities relating to food or water
supply, and even to office building ventilation
So the critics that say we are not
doing enough are always going to be right. The
issue is, how can we make the debate and the
way we go forward a little more constructive
than that. There is never going to be enough
money to solve everything. I think the
opportunity that this Commission has, that some
independent nonpartisan body can have, whether
it is the GAO or a commission like this that
goes forward, that goes on, is that it can set
specific tangible standards for improvement in
homeland security. It can set up, to give you
an example, it can declare that if we have our
undercover people who work for a commission
like this, trying to sneak something into the
port, it should be detected by Customs, by
Homeland Security 99.6 percent of the time and
let's give the American people a report every
quarter or every half year of how we are doing.
Let's set goals. We can target these things
and we can set goals. We can't do everything.
The debate we have today is really one
where it is easy to be partisan. It is really
easy because you can always say, if there is a
terror attack, and there is going to be another
terror attack, and when there is whether it is
in the subways, or general aviation or ports,
there will always be a way to point and say
that somebody screwed up.
For example, Customs has initiated a
very intelligent program in risk management
called The Customs Partnership. What they do
is, they prescreen the truck drivers who drive
the most over the Ambassador Bridge in Detroit.
They are screened in advance and because they
are screened they get something which gets them
on a fast line. That is really intelligent.
We can all sit here and say that is
The test for this country, the test
for the dialogue we are all going to have is
that if, God forbid, one of the people who has
gone through that screening does something
terrible, are we going to have all kinds of
recriminations and say, "we should stop every
truck. That was a stupid plan, how could we
have done it." Or are we going say, "well, we
started a system, the system still makes sense.
It didn't work in this case, that doesn't mean
we scrap the system and go back to what we were
doing at the airports on September 12, which
was checking everybody, no matter who they were
or what they were."
The point I am really trying to make
is that we have to think about intelligent risk
management. The most important place we have
to think about it is in the private sector, or
certainly not the Federal sector. There are
1750 check points at all the airports in the
United States of America combined, 1750. There
are approximately 1760 entrances to the New York
City subway system. We all agree that TSA is
doing a great job.
So for only $6 billion and 45,000 new
employees, we could protect the New York City
subway system the way we are protecting the
For those of us who ride the subway,
that sounds like a pretty good idea, but we
can't do that. And by the way, when we decide
to do that we have to deal with the 17,000
entrances to office buildings in Manhattan.
When we get through there, we probably want to
start thinking about Chicago, San Francisco,
Los Angles and everywhere else.
We can't simply throw that kind money
at the problem. We have to get the private
sector involved. I think we have to have
something on the order of a voluntary identity
card that companies in the private sector can
issue to people that screens them, voluntarily,
so that when we have lines, as we are going to
have in office systems, subway stations and
train terminals, we are going to have those
lines after the next attack. And when we do
that we are managing the risk a little more
The one thought I really want to leave
you with is, I think the best thing a
commission like this can do is either suggest
or else go and do it itself, setting specific
goals in all the areas you are talking about.
And then instead of the Democrats criticizing
the Republicans for not spending enough money
here, and the Republicans saying yes, but we
have reorganized the Government and we now have
this department so obviously we are doing
enough. We hold a press conference to say we
are spending this much money here, that is not
a constructive debate.
You can quantify this. You can manage
this the way people in the private sector
manage lots of problems by settling specific
goals, specific timetables, and having a
nonpartisan body report on how we are doing.
I thank you.
MR. KEAN: If it is acceptable to the
other members of the panel, knowing Mr. Brill
has to leave, is it all right if he takes five
minutes of questioning now?
MR. BRILL: Thank you for you
MR. KEAN: I understand that. In that
case Commissioner Ben Veniste and Commissioner
Fielding will ask five minutes worth of
MR. BEN VENISTE: Mr. Brill, I am
quite interested in the fact that you have, in
the course of the past year or so, spoken to
people who are on the front line of protecting
the United States in the post 9/11 environment,
and have not limited yourself to those who are
in supervisory positions, who are at the very
top of the agencies.
You state that it is necessary to
demonstrate our support for these individuals
whose views in the long term, rather than in
less optimal kinds of supervision, that
Congress and others are able to maintain.
How would you coordinate that kind of,
or conform that kind of appreciation for to
those who are dedicated to protecting this
country, with the kind of accountability and
review that is also necessary for us to conduct
so that we may inform our recommendations, at
the end of the day, with a body of information
that not only provides an historical record,
but provides a baseline for our
MR. BRILL: I think that's the
challenge. I don't want to minimize that
challenge. Indeed, if I just sat here and
said, well, you know you need to have as many
whistle blowers as possible come and sit at
this table and tell you what's wrong with each
and every Federal agency, that would be much
too simple. A lot of whistle blowers just have
gripes that relate to labor problems, or their
own personal problems, they haven't been
promoted or they are just unhappy. All
organizations have that.
So it is not simply, "let the whistle
blowers speak." It is much more trying to set
just to give you an example, if Washington
says that the ports are safer and, by the way,
the ports are safer. The 2 percent number is a
fiction. They are inspecting a much higher
ratio of the truly dangerous cargo and they deserve
a lot of credit for that, but the people who
deserve the credit for that are not only Bob
Bonner and his team in Washington, but the
customs inspectors on the port that I sat with
here in New Jersey, and in other places, who
devised their own factoring system so that they
could take a container and have notice of a
container and decide which ones were the high
What happened was, Washington, they
consulted with those people and said, you tell
us, tell us what should be in this list of a
hundred or two hundred factors that we should
look at. You guys have the experience. There
are some agencies that do that, there are other
agencies don't. If you want a sweeping
generalization I will give you one; Customs
good, INS bad.
There is no deadline the INS has ever
had in anyone's memory in this room that they
have ever met. There is nothing they have ever
said they are going to do that they ever did.
I keep kidding my friend, Tom Ridge, that is
now your problem and I can't wait to see how
you solve it. Because a lot of people,
including some of the people at this table,
such as the former Deputy Attorney General,
have been in charge of solving that problem and
haven't solved it.
But the way to do it is, again, to try
to take the politics out of it. It is easy for
a senator to say you are not spending enough
money on this because you can never spend
enough, and it is easy for people in power to
hold a press conference saying we are do doing
this, we are doing this, we are doing this.
They are right, they are, and they are well
motivated sincere people.
The issue is, we don't care what you
say, what we want to know is, is the port
x percent safer today than it was last month?
Is general aviation any safer?
The way Washington has solved general
aviation issue is, you can't fly into National
Airport. That is the one thing they have done,
that the gentleman here didn't talk about.
That is the only safety measure, so far, for
general aviation. There have got to be other
standards you can set for that. There ought to
be productivity standards. This management
goal, this management goal, did you meet it,
did you not meet it? And that takes a
nonpartisan group, like the group assembled
here, who can issue reports to the country the
way we get economic reports every quarter. We
are this much safer here, we are not safer
MR. BEN VENISTE: Just to follow up
MR. KEAN: I just want to get
Commissioner Fielding in. We only have two
minutes of questions.
MR. FIELDING: I just want you to
thank you for sugarcoating your comments about
MR. BRILL: Actually, they were
MR. FIELDING: I am sure they were.
MR. BRILL: No profanities or
MR. FIELDING: Just to follow up,
since we are short on time. One of our tasks
is to try to figure out what's the best way to
proceed every day as we go forward, because we
get a little bit of information and then we get
a little bit more and we try to put it all
together in some sort of a mosaic.
We have hearings like this, where
people come in and are limited by their time,
by their statements and that sort of thing. So
we are very free and easy to ask of people,
such as yourself, if you would stay with us and
cooperate with us as we move forward?
MR. BRILL: I would love to. This is
a particularly bad day for me, today
MR. FIELDING: I understand that.
MR. BRILL: I will spend all day any
day to help you with this.
MR. FIELDING: You obviously have a
list of people or categories of people that we
could learn from as we move forward. We don't
intend to only speak with people in charge.
MR. BRILL: I certainly didn't mean to
imply that either.
MR. FIELDING: I understand that. So
if you could do that.
The other thing which I think we could
call upon you, is obviously goals and standards
could be the same management issues as anything
else. We have to figure out and prioritize
goals and standards so that we may have goals
for bus traffic, but we might not have goals
MR. BRILL: Exactly.
MR. FIELDING: There, again, I would
hope that we could call on you as we work our
way through this. Thank you.
MR. BRILL: Thank you.
MR. KEAN: Thank you very much, Mr.
MR. BRILL: You're welcome.
MR. KEAN: I call on Mr. Wermuth.
MR. WERMUTH: Thank you Mr. Chairman,
Mr. Vice Chairman, distinguished members of the
panel. Thank you for the opportunity to be
As many of you know from other
positions that you have held, RAND has been
doing terrorism research and analysis for more
than 35 years. We have some of the leading
experts in the country who have been involved
in that process for a long time. In fact, at
least one and perhaps more will appear before
this panel in the coming days.
I am going talk primarily about the
work that we have been honored to do for the
last four years now, in providing the research
and analytical support to the advisory panel to
assess domestic response capabilities for
terrorism involving weapons of mass
destruction, also euphemistically known as the
From the written testimony that I
submitted, you will see the Congressional
authority for the creation of that panel, and
its specific Congressional mandate, a lot of
information on the composition of that panel
and why many people think that panel is unique
primarily because it is made of men and women
who represent the first response or community,
people in law enforcement, fire services,
emergency medical services, public health as
well as people who have Washington experience
and intelligence, and military affairs and
This panel lost one of its most
distinguished members in the attacks of
September 11, Ray Downey, Deputy Department
Chief of Special Operations of the Fire
Department of the City of New York. Of course,
the incident commander on the day of those
attacks died in the collapse of the North Tower that
You will see from the written
testimony, in considerable detail, that this
panel has been very consistent from its
inception, and long before September 11, 2001,
it submitted its first report to the President
and the Congress in December of 1999. It has
now submitted four and will submit a fifth in
December of this year, before it goes out of
But throughout its deliberations and
policy pronouncements to President and Congress,
it has consistently adhered to the view that
intelligence is key to this entire effort. And
that the proper organizational structure, the
proper coordination of intelligence collection,
analysis and dissemination, not only within a
few select federal agencies, but even with
state and local response entities, and now what
is becoming increasingly obvious is that
perhaps key elements of the private sector have
to be included in that process. That getting
the intelligence piece right is paramount to
everything that we do.
Prior panelists, I am sure others on
this panel will continue to note that we are
infinitely vulnerable. We cannot defend
against everything. We cannot secure and
protect against everything. The importance of
intelligence and getting that intelligence into
the hands of people who need it is critical to
all of our efforts. The nexus between
intelligence and law enforcement is also
Having people both in the
intelligence world and all law enforcement
world, understand and appreciate what the other
parts of all of that effort really means.
This panel started in 1999 and
throughout its reports have made significant
substantive recommendations about both
structure and process for improving our
intelligence collection analysis and
In December of 2000, in its second
report, it recommended the creation of an
entity in the Executive Office of the
President. Similar, though not exactly, to
what eventually became the Office of Homeland
Security under Tom Ridge. As part of that
recommendation this panel said we need a better
structure. We need a coordinated intelligence
effort that brings together all of the
agencies, as well as state and local response
entities. To have a more complete, a more
comprehensive, a more effective way of
gathering and disseminating intelligence
In subsequent reports the panel has
continued with those themes in ways to improve
some of the specific pieces of intelligence
operations in its most recent report, and that
is also detailed for you in the written
testimony. We have also provided copies of
that report to the Commission staff for each
of you to have.
The panel recommended the creation of
something that it called the "National Counterterrorism Center" an all source intelligence
fusion analysis and dissemination center that
would be comprised of pieces of the various
agencies directly involved. The Central
Intelligence Agency, the Department of Justice,
other components of the intelligence community,
to bring together all of the raw intelligence
data, if you will, and to try to make some
sense out of that in a comprehensive fashion.
To include in that process, representatives of
states and localities that would also help to
inform through their resources, all the way
down to the local beat cop on the street, and
to develop the best possible intelligence
products for dissemination to people who have
need to know that information.
The President announced in his State
to the Union address, something called the
Terrorism Threat Integration Center. Something
similar to what this panel had recommended two
months before, not exactly the same and I would
be happy to address the differences between
what this panel recommended and what the
President has called for. But needless to say,
this panel was focused on this and a number of
other issues that you can see in our reports,
long before September 11. It has been open and
unabashed about its policy recommendations.
One of the things that it has said
consistently with all due deference to the
former United States senators and the two
former members of Congress on this panel, but
Congress still doesn't have its act together.
It is getting better, but for a long time was
not willing to organize itself in a way that
would address these issues more effectively.
At least the House of Representatives have now
started doing do that.
With that, I will complete my oral
remarks by thanking you again for the
opportunity to be here and to offer this
Commission any assistance that this advisory
panel can provide to you and, of course,
anything that the RAND Corporation and any of
it components can do, to help you with your
very challenging tasks in the months ahead.
MR. KEAN: Thank you, Mr. Wermuth. I
have a feeling we will be taking you up on that
MS. BAIRD: Thank you very much. I
appreciate the opportunity to be here. We all,
in our small way, hope that we can honor the
memories of victims of 9/11 and we thank you
for giving us this opportunity to contribute
to your effort to do that.
I have a few comments I would like to
make, but I must say that my contribution to
this Commission is already so large that
anything else I say will be purely redundant
and additive because you have the privilege of
having the Executive Director of the Markle
Task Force now as your executive director, and
that will be the most important decision you
have made. So I commend you. And if I can
help in other ways too, I am happy to.
Our task force was focused on the use
of information in order to prevent terrorism
and protect the national security. September 11
exposed for world view what was already well
known in Washington, that we needed to reform
our intelligence and information systems in
order to deal with new threats.
I had the privilege of serving in 1995
on a congressionally created commission on the
future roles and missions of the intelligence
community, and at that point in time there was
no mandate from Congress to look at terrorism
or weapons of mass destruction. We added it to
our agenda, but it wasn't in the public debate
as an important future role for the
That is of great significance because
we had several years which would have been
terribly important to develop the capabilities
we need to protect the country in which we
didn't do that. Where we had few people who
spoke the languages we needed to understand.
Where we didn't begin to think about the
revamping of the very essence of how we do
business and intelligence and information
sharing. But instead we tried to patch a
system that was designed against a singular
state enemy instead of trying to understand the
new enemies and emerging threats.
I think that you can't fail to look at
that as you do your work, because you need to
know what we have to do differently now.
There is a great deal of discussion in
Washington about the need for every agency to
invest in filling these stove pipes with more
information, or in connecting the dots and
connecting information between agencies. But
that is the same debate that we had about
revamping the intelligence community in 1995
and 1996. It is using the same model of how we
have always done business, to say that we
should be able to do more of it.
The current need is radically
different. You have heard from a number of
people about the need for information down at
the ends of the system, if you will, with state
and local responders, with police, with
firefighters. You know the numbers, you know
there are 11,000 plus FBI agents and there are
50 times that in terms of state and local law
enforcers. What do we want these people to be
doing? What is their role in the system?
We don't, in this country, want a
system which will make all of those people and
the UPS truck drivers intelligence agents. Our
country isn't worth protecting if it becomes a
police state where everyone is collecting
information and putting it into massive
databases that we can then run programs against
in order to find out who is doing what.
But we do need to develop a system
which moves the information to the people in
local communities who need it when they need,
and what they need, not everything, but
what they need. We need to have a system that
pulls that information into central places in
Federal Government when it is needed for the
purposes that it is needed.
That system our task force which
was composed of one of the imminent members of
your panel, Senator Gorton, as well as the
whole range of people with experience both in
Washington and in intelligence and on the Hill,
as well as people from the state and local
governments, and quite a number of people from
the information technology community.
We looked at this problem and we said
the system can be built in a way that both
enhances security and protects the privacy and
liberty interests. As long as those two
interests are the key design elements for the
system, and it is built together, that the
system can be built with existing technology.
This is not a matter of creating substantial
new technologies over a long period of time
that are more sophisticated and do more. In
fact, a great deal of what we want to be able
to do, is already done in the private sector.
So the question then becomes, how do
you construct the system in a way that is
comprehensive in the reach of who can
participate in it, but not undermining of the
civil liberties of people about whom you
Our conclusion is that the essence of
doing that, is that the President has to
develop guidelines for creating the balance
between privacy and security, and that there
needs to be a public debate about what the
criteria should be for those guidelines.
We made a number of recommendations in
our report, but your forum may be a very good
one in which to inspire the public debate.
Because as Steve Brill was saying and others,
unfortunately we still swing wildly and polemically from the
"protect security," to the "protect privacy" sides
of the spectrum, and it doesn't do us any good
to have a unanimous resolution passed to shut
down a program on privacy grounds, and then to
have actions taken by the Attorney General
without consultation on security grounds.
We are swinging back and forth in a
way which won't enhance security and we are
doing it in a political environment, which is
just going to leave people sitting here a year
from now when you report, feeling no more
secure than they do today.
We couldn't possibly harden all the
targets. I mean, this is a refrain you will
hear from everyone. Even if you pursue the
kind of management tool that Steve was talking
about, which seems very, very sensible, you
will still not be able to harden all the
So what do you need to do? You need
to have an information system that enables you
to know who it is that is in the country who is
hostile and might be inclined to undertake
these actions. And when does that hostility
merge with the capability to actually carry out
an action, so that you have a real threat to
the country. That is an information challenge.
People who are hostile do us no harm unless
they also have the capability to act.
You need information on both sides of
that, and you need to understand when those
come together to actually create a threat.
We know that if we had used the
information we already had on 9/11, that there
is a great deal we would have learned, that
two of these terrorists were on the INS
terrorist watch list, that they had common
addresses and common frequent flyer numbers
with other terrorists.
Now, out of the vast amount of
information, even if we had the kind of systems
that we talk about, could we have prevented
that attack? I can't tell you that we could
have. But we could have felt much, much better
about the role our government plays in
protecting our citizens, which is one of its
Therefore, it seems to me that as we
are looking at what we need to do in the
immediate term, we need to have the public
debate that talks about the balance between
privacy and security. The President needs to
develop guidelines which will govern the
Federal Government and inform the states and
localities, and we need to, in addition, invest
in state and local governments being part of
this system, because the funding isn't there
for them to participate.
There are some very good people doing
good work in their local areas, but they don't
have the guidelines that empower them and
constrain them, and they don't have the funds to
undertake what they need to pursue.
So with that I will close my comments
and be happy to answer questions. Thank you.
MR. KEAN: Thank you very much. Mr.
MR. LARSEN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman,
distinguished members. At the Institute for
Homeland Security we have been working on this
specific topic for about three years. We are
just about ready to finish and submit a report
which we will provide copies to this Committee.
It will not be released to the general public,
due to the sensitive nature.
We have focussed on intelligence and
law enforcement from a somewhat nontraditional
perspective. We got together 15 senior people
from each of four communities; law enforcement,
intelligence, public health and agriculture, to
look at how they could better share
information. Food supply is a great concern in
this country about how it could be attacked.
We have discovered there are great
cultural barriers to that. It took us about
six hours to figure out what "business casual"
meant with that community in our first outset.
When the word "prevention" came up we found out
that people in the intelligence community have
a completely different definition than people
from public health or agriculture.
In the Department of Defense where I
spent 32 years, we have a DOD dictionary of
military and associated terms. So we all know
what the term "general war" means. We may not
agree with it, but that's what the Secretary of
Defence signed. That does not happen in interagency
community, but we will be happy to
provide a copy of that, and I think you will
find it interesting.
I submitted my comments last week so I
will not repeat them, but I will highlight
three issues from there. I see from the letter
that I was sent from this Commission it says
you are chartered to prepare full and complete
account of the circumstances surrounding the
events of September 11, 2001. As a tax payer,
I would prefer that you focus on the future,
not the past. If this Commission were
beginning one month after 9/11, that might be
available. I have seen so many changes, I am
not sure of the value looking at the old
When I say you should focus on the
future, I am not talking about next year,
because you are not going to fix it for the
next year, about what we need in the 21st century.
I think your focus should be out around the
five year point, about which this country is
going to need.
I think there are two alternative
futures for the day you release your report. I
believe May of next year. One of them will be,
there will be in new attacks on the American
Homeland and the American people, and Congress
will expect a certain sort of recommendation
from a Commission that is operating in that
The other alternative is, I think is,
we could have had several attacks, perhaps major
attacks, perhaps even an attack with a weapon
of mass destruction. And I think the American
people and Congress would expect a completely
different recommendation from this committee.
I think we all understand that 9/11
was not what changed everything. It is the
technological revolution that has changed
the threat to hour homeland. Because of the
technological resolution small nations and
small well financed terrorist organizations can
threaten our survival in this country. That is
the scenario you must work with because that is
going to happen whether it is next month, next
year or five years, we know there has been a
fundamental change in the international
security equation. That is what you must deal
We did an exercise last November, John
Hamre from CSIS and myself led Silent Vector.
It was the follow on to the Dark Winter
exercise that we did 18 months ago. I have
given you a handout from Silent Vector, and
once again I apologize, because we cannot
release this to the public. It is not
classified or anything, but we think it is
sensitive and we don't like to provide
terrorists information that would end up in the
newspapers or something.
But what we discovered when we were
working on this exercise was, it was an
unusual. Senior leaders, Sam Nunn played the
President; Jim Woolsey played Bill Sessions
former FBI Governor, Governor Gilmore played
Governor of Virginia. The attack never
occurred in the exercise. It was about
specific incredible intelligence information
coming in, and John Hamre and I wanted to see
where we could force them to make decisions
that would have an enormous economic impact,
perhaps even more than the attack itself, what
they would do.
What we discovered in the six months
that we were preparing for the exercise was,
there is no system in the Federal Government
today, no organization that looks at
intelligence information that flows in, law
enforcement information and a vulnerability
assessment and puts them into a fusion center,
or as some people like to say, an integration
center to look at all this. And then combine
that with the sort of data binding capabilities
other panel members were talking about, that
could then provide real time information to
senior elected and appointed officials about
how to use their limited resources. If you are
the president, governor, mayor or county
executive. How do you do that?
I spent a lot of time talking to
mayors and chiefs of police. Two weeks ago I
was talking to the Sheriffs' Association of
Illinois and I said, how would you know what's
protecting your county, if I told you there is
a specific threat? Where is your big
With a chart like this, and this is
rather simple, that just eight people put
together over a few months. There is no
organization doing this.
Now the NAPSI that I know, Commission,
you worked on for a while, was somewhat focused
on the cyber aspects of it, and it was a good
model because they did look at all sources of
intelligence information, law enforcement, but
I don't think the vulnerability assessment
covered enough of the physical.
But when you look at this, we came up
with some very specific information, if you
only have limited resources to use your
national guard or state troopers or whatever,
it gives you an idea where you have got to go.
This integration center we are talking about,
is not only valuable for prevention, it is also
valuable for how we are going to spend the
money for mitigation and response.
This sort of center could provide that
information on as a vulnerability assessment,
what the threats are, what the capabilities
are, what the intentions are, so we know where
to spend our money.
Because my bottom line and the whole
thing about homeland security, and I began
studying this in 1994, biological warfare is
what brought me into the homeland security
business. My greatest threat, even though I am
very worried about the future of genetically
engineered biological weapons, which I think is
a very serious threat, Nuclear weapons, cyber
weapons, you name it. The one that I fear the
most is uncontrolled spending. If we do not
establish the right priorities, we will spend
ourselves into bankruptcy like the Soviet Union
did in the Cold War.
7500 miles of border, are we going to
spend billions on building imaginal lines along
our border, when Ramsey Josef in 1993 attacked
the World Trade Center with a bomb built across
the river. Timothy McVeigh built his bomb in
Kansas. When Aum Shinrikyo made their sarin,
they made it in Tokyo a few miles from where
The only weapon you need to bring
across our border is a nuclear weapon. You
don't even need to bring a radiological
disposal device across our border. I saw a
picture in a newspaper the other day, one of
these scanners that looks at the shipping
containers. The x ray uses cesium 137. That
is one of the best things to use for
radiological disposal device. You just put the
bomb in the container, you don't even need the
radiological material, it is in the x ray
machine right there at the port.
My point is, we cannot build a Maginot
line. I am concerned about setting priorities
and I think that's the most valuable thing this
Commission can provide American people. A
sense of priorities on this information
integration center that will help not only for
prevention, but mitigation and response.
That information will be most important. It
will be the best investment this country can
make in security.
Thank you, sir.
MR. KEAN: Thank you, Mr. Larsen.
Commissioner Ben Veniste and Commission
MR. BEN VENISTE: Can I first turn to
Mr. Wermuth and Ms. Baird. First of all, we
are very grateful for your contribution. You
have submitted very important materials that go
far beyond your oral presentations today, and
we thank you for those and for your pledge of
cooperation, which we will take you up on.
To comment very briefly on Mr.
Larsen's observation as a tax payer; we are
charged by our statute to investigate the
circumstances of 9/11, but we are not starting
from September 12. We are building upon the
very good work done by the Joint Inquiry and
other entities which have investigated that,
and our mandate is to use that material as a
jumping off point to conclude the
investigation, hopefully, to provide a
definitive review of what went wrong on
September 11 that will withstand historical
scrutiny. But we are not going to reinvent the
wheel, and please be assured of that.
Both of you have talked about the
balance between technological improvements for
our security and the imperative of protecting
our civil liberties. There is obviously a
great deal of tension between those two.
I am interested that, Ms. Baird, you
have suggested that this Commission may be an
appropriate forum for the national debate with
respect to those perhaps competing objectives.
Protecting our security and yet protecting our
civil rights, for it is quite clear that if we
spend days hiding under the table or afraid
because of increased scrutiny on us, that our
civil liberties are gone. Then our opponents
will have won a victory just as easily as Mr.
Larsen has said, we spend ourselves into
bankruptcy as the Soviet Union did.
So I would like to ask you to
elaborate on what you view as the principal
points between enhanced security and protection
of our civil liberties.
MR. WERMUTH: The advisory panel has,
on more than one occasion, used a quotation, I
think, to describe how it feels about that
issue and the quote goes, "They that would give
up essential liberty for a little temporary
safety, deserve neither liberty nor safety."
That's Benjamin Franklin in 1759.
This panel has been focused on civil
liberties. It has said consistently the civil
liberties of the citizens of the United States
are really what make us unique in the all the
world. Nobody else has the kind of system and
protections for civil rights and privacy
considerations that we do in the United States.
Having said that, the panel has
articulated ways that we can use existing laws.
We don't need significantly expanded laws, more
intrusive capability. A lot of this is
structure and process. It is simply taking
things that we can already acquire under our
laws, whether it is through the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act or other court
supervised activities, or simply information
that can be gathered legally in any number of
The idea is to bring all that
information together and to fuse it, to use
that term of the vernacular, to analyze it, to
create some products out of it that makes sense
and then get it into the hands of people who
need to have it.
This panel has been concerned, Randy
mentioned, with subsequent terrorist attacks. This
panel has been concerned that we have an
opportunity now to get this right, structurally
and process wise. If we don't, the hue and cry
from the American public, if it is still wrong
when the next attack occurs, may cause that
pendulum to swing too far, and we will feel
compelled or there will be public pressure to
compel the Government, perhaps, to be more
intrusive, to chip away at civil liberties.
The men and women, at least of this
organization and certainly RAND's research has
been articulating that over the years, we
don't want to do that. We want to find things
that are consistent with the Constitution,
consistent with the statutes that are on the
books and protections that we have, where we
don't find ourselves under the kind of pressure
of another attack or pending attacks where we
do something. That is not consistent with
those values that we have held for so long and
make us then very much like a lot of other
countries who don't have the kinds of
protection that we do.
MS. BAIRD: I would suggest that there
are two ways that you might look at this
question. First of all, the development of
guidelines are really the essence of striking
that balance. And what I mean by "guidelines"
are directives that make very clear for people
in the system, from Washington out into the
local communities. What it is that they can do
and what it is that they can't do. What they
are empowered to do and what the limits are on
Right now we have a drive for unfocused
collection of information everywhere, and then
even less focused or less targeted oversight
of the collection of that information. We have
privacy czars, we have Congressional oversight
bodies, and everyone is trying to grab at what
they think is the area where they need to limit
what's going on.
The dynamic then that gets set up is
those who have these weighty responsibilities,
who don't want to be sitting here in front of
you having failed when another terrorist attack
occurs, are doing everything they can to use
information to provide security. But they
don't have guidance and accountability being
assumed by policy makers for what it is they
should be doing, and what the limits are of
what they should be doing.
So you have a system that really does
not provide either security or privacy. So
these guidelines, we believe, are really the
essence of making the clear determinations
about what kind of information we need, who
needs to have it, who should be providing it,
and how that information moves in and out of
those who need it, both in the public sector
and the private sector.
The other part of this guideline
point that I would make is, that a great deal
of the information that we need to enhance
security is in the private sector. It is our
belief that it ought to stay in the private
sector and be drawn on the when the Government
needs it. This is not necessarily popular in
the private sector because it creates an
obligation and a relationship with the government
which doesn't exist in every part of the
private sector, but where it does exist in the
financial services community, for example, it
has been very successful and not unduly
burdensome for the private sector. Again, with
very clear guidelines about what kind of
information people in the private sector are
required to retain, for how long, how it is
accessed and what their liability is for that.
Just again to be brief, the second
point that I would make, that I would encourage
you to look at, is the responsibility of the
FBI in relationship to other agencies of the
It is our belief that the FBI should
do collection, if you will,
the kind of law enforcement collection of
information that the FBI undertakes now; but
that the FBI should not be the agency that is
our equivalent of a domestic intelligence
agency. We won't probably ever say we have a
domestic intelligence agency, but in fact, the
collection of information to inform policy
makers, which is what intelligence is, as
opposed to information that is collected for
law enforcement. It is our belief should be driven
out of the Department of Homeland Security.
That is for important civil liberty
reasons as well as capabilities of different
agencies, because if the people who collect the
information are those who can take away your
liberty by arresting you, then there is a
greater threat to civil liberties from the
collection of information by the government,
and it is unnecessary given that we have to
build this capability for the first time
somewhere. So we concluded that building it at
the FBI was not the right place, again, as part
of that balance.
MR. BEN VENISTE: We are going to
drill down a little further on who gets the
authority for the collection and dissemination,
because I think each of you have a different
views about that. But just to follow up on
this point, what I hear from both of you is
that the means that we have available,
presently existing, are sufficient. That there
is no great need for some other silver bullet
kind of intrusive collection mechanism, but
rather the dissemination, the coordination was
As we go forward and recognizing the
imperative of individuals who are charged with
guarding our homeland security, and their
natural response to the obligations they have,
where do you see the point of where the rubber
meets the road on the civil liberties issue?
Where do you see it coming down?
MS. BAIRD: One way to look at that is
the question of whether you need to collect
information on individuals, or at what point do
you need to collect information on individuals,
and what kind of information. For example, if
a police officer stops Mohamed Atta and needs
to go to a database to find out about this
person, he doesn't know need to know everything
about Mohamed Atta. He just needs to know not
no to let him go. He needs to know to bring
him in so that whoever has information about
him is informed, this person where the red
lights go off, has been stopped.
I think a very key part of the design
of the system is to decide who needs to know
what about individuals, and who needs to know
what about events or activities that they need
to report to others. There are a lot of ways
to you probably get news alerts on your
e mail all the time. There are a lot of ways
to move information around, to alert people to
things that are developing, or to have people
understand that they have come across something
that others need to know about, without having
to actually inform everyone in the system about
I think that is a very important part
of the design of the role of all the actors in
MR. WOLOSKY: I don't know that there
is a hard and fast rule that you can apply to
say something is or is not an encroachment on
civil liberties that will apply in every
Fortunately, the American people are
not reticent about speaking up on things that
they think are problems with their own privacy
and liberty, as well as security interest.
We all know, those of us, and half of
this panels that are lawyers by profession, and
some of the rest of us who are here testifying,
with every civil liberty, with every civil
right there is a corresponding obligation.
We are willing in a reasonable context
to do things like going through searches of our
person and our baggage when we go on airplanes
because we know security risk. So there are
things that have to be applied in different
situations, but I suggest it is a commonsense
rule. We simply need to be cognizant of not
going too far in any context so that we
encroach on civil liberties, but we are always
going to be in that balancing act between
security and civil liberties, and we just need
to make sure that we try to address as many of
those as we can in the calm between the storms,
if you will, so that we are not forced into a
situation of going overboard, as I said before,
when the next attack occurs.
MR. KEAN: Mr. Larsen, you want speak.
MR. LARSEN: Yes, sir. In December I
met with some folks here in New York City
Police Department, their intelligence
organization, and they talked to me about a
program we need to look at called Advance
Tip offs. It is technology that already
exists, they were asking if they could only
have the funding to make it work.
If they would have existed on July 5,
2001, when the Florida State Trooper pulled
over Mohamed Atta for speeding, and punched it
into the National Crime Information Center, it
would have tied it to 17 different watch lists,
everybody from Customs, INS, DEA, CIA and
others. As Zoe said, It would not say we want
him for this or whatever, it would just say,
don't let him go.
I think the American people would have
no problem with that. The technology can
protect some of the privacy. But I think
privacy is going to be one of the most
important issues you ate going to address. It should
be addressed when you have a year to sit down
and do this. Not the two weeks that it took to
pass the Patriot Act, 362 pages that changed 17
laws. I haven't had time to read that. I
wonder how many members of Congress read it,
and how difficult it is when it says change
subparagraph c from "and" to "or." That would
take a tremendous amount of work. I doubt if
any member of Congress read the entire Patriot
Act. That's what this Commission can do.
I think you also need to look at, what
are the real standards of privacy in this
country today. We hosted a seminar at George
Washington University, cohosted with the
Institute in the Elliot School a couple of
weeks ago, where we looked at law enforcement
intelligence and one thing, what's the new
One of the professors at George
Washington recently made a trip to a conference
in California and as he got to the airport he
realized he forgot his running shoes, he is a
big runner. He said, no problem, I will buy
some new ones, he had got a lot of miles on
them. He checks into the hotel, he goes to the
store and finds the running shoes that he
likes, he buys those. He sees a great pair of
mens dress shoes on sale, a pretty good price,
so he buys them.
Did you ever have it when your credit
card comes back saying, you're little it bit
out of the profile, what's your mother's maiden
name or whatever that is.
This guy is a computer information
specialist at George Washington University, so
he asked the person on the phone, what made it
pop out of your computer. He said, three
things. First of all, you never bought shoes
in California, you never bought two pair of
shoes in one day, and you have never bought
black dress shoes.
Now, I am not going to tell you which
credit card this was, but one of those big
credit cards knows that about you too.
Now, that sort of information would
not be available to the FBI, but it would be to
your bank card. What are the standards? We
allow the banks to get away with that. I think
you need to spend some time with folks in here,
very seriously talking about new standards of
We all lived in a small farming
community where I grew up. We knew what
everybody was going because it was a small
community and we knew everyone. It is a
different society we live in now and I think you
really need to spend some time looking at what
those standards are.
MR. FIELDING: Obviously, that is an
issue that we could go on all afternoon, but
unfortunately we are short of time.
I would also like to thank you all for
your cooperation and for coming here today, and
the tremendous paperwork that you have provided
for us, which is going to be first read by
those people and then by us. We do appreciate
I am afraid we have to get onto really
some organizational issues which are apparent
from this topic, but it has been suggested to
us in various ways that there is no real need
for additional organization structure,
especially within the Federal Government. That
the authorities that are needed for that exist,
they are just not fulfilled. I would
appreciate each of your comments on that, as an
initial subject on the organizational side of
MR. WERMUTH: I think we would agree
in terms of the authority to conduct certain
activities, as you see will from the written
testimony in connection with this national
counter terrorism center which, to a certain
extent, has some of the characteristics that
the President's initiative for the terrorist
threat integration center terms of fusion.
The research that we did, the
recommendation that Gilmore Commission made for
the creation of that center was not to create
something new in addition to existing
structures, but to bring pieces of other
agencies together and put them in the same
room, if you will, and require them to work
together collectively, comprehensively, rather
than working from some distance apart with all
the culture problems and other barriers that
exist between and among Federal entities.
The panel said, take people that are
already doing this and put them together.
Don't create something brand new and in
addition to everything else. We have got
statutory authority. We have got existing
capability. We have got expertise in these in
compartments, but they are simply not together.
Bring them together. We happen to say a little
differently than what the Markle Foundation
recommendation was. Don't it put it in
either Department of Homeland Security or the
Central Intelligence Agency or any other
department. Put it where it is truly
independent and objective, an honest broker
because they are a lot of customers. The
Department of Homeland Security is not the only
customer. The Central Intelligence Agency is
not the only customer. The Department of
Justice is not the only customer.
Put it in a place where there really
aren't the inherent pressures, if you will, and
the competition for resources within an
existing agency. Make it free standing,
objective, independent, but bring all the
pieces together into that single location.
That's what we said in a structure standpoint.
And by the way, we don't need
additional statutory authority other than
authority maybe to move the responsibilities
for those from the agencies where they are into
this other structure.
MR. FIELDING: Ms. Baird.
MS. BAIRD: Yes, I would just say that
I think that there is so much to be done to
build on the existing capabilities and to
create the activities that need to be
undertaken, that I would put your focus there
rather than putting your focus on thinking
about new laws or new authorities, because
there is a great deal of capability, legal
authority, and talent and agency commitment that
needs to be developed. That should really be
I do think that the Department of
Homeland Security has an important domestic
role to play, that you can encourage, be played
out by that department. It has quite a number
of agencies in it that have a great deal of
information that needs to be part of this
system and that needs to be drawn on by the
rest of the Government and the locales.
It also had the potential of being a
single point of contact for much of the private
sector information, which is not going to
comfortably be shared with CIA or foreign
intelligence community. So as the Department
of Homelands Security is ramping up and much of
the activity that was hoped for by those who
passed the legislation on Capitol Hill, is
being pulled into other agencies other than
Department of Homeland Security or umbrella
You might look hard at what you would
encourage the Department of Homeland Security
to be able to do, and particularly on the
domestic front, what is important to have
happened in an agency that is not under the
direction of the Director of Central
Intelligence. What will the American people be
more comfortable having undertaken and be
guided by a domestic agency as opposed to a
foreign intelligence agency. And I think you
have seen some of the debates on Capitol Hill,
much more skittishness about the potential for
privacy intrusions from the Defense Department
or the foreign intelligence community, than
people feel about domestic agencies, and I
would look hard at that.
MR. FIELDING: But, of course, the DCI
exists as a concept. Is it your feeling that
that's just not a popular vehicle for doing
MS. BAIRD: I don't think you will
ever persuade the American people that the
Director of Central Intelligence is a benign
entity, because we have operated outside this
country with rules we will not be comfortable
applying inside the country, and he has been
responsible for those operations.
Perhaps five or ten years from now,
after the system sorts itself out and people
understand comfortably how we can use
information domestically to protect security,
people with come to that. But I think that
will not be a comfortable place to have the
leadership for domestic intelligence or
information collection, particularly from the
MR. LARSEN: I don't think this new
organization, that I would like to see, fits
under the Department of Justice or DCI. At one
time I thought it might fit under the new
Department of Homeland Security, but I am no
longer sure now.
Unfortunately, I think what John
Gannon was trying to do over there got
derailed. I think there was some potential
there. Clearly the terrorism threat
intelligence center does not give us what we
need, and clearly, we cannot have it under law
enforcement, that is the part I think the
American people will insist, that we must
protect the rights of the accused. So I think
there are other models we can look at in other
countries that could perhaps give you some
vision here. My final recommendation here was,
I think you need to start with a blank piece of
The first time I went to visit the
NAPSI, and I say NAPSI was a wonderful model
that came out of PDD 39, the previous
administration, where they fused those things
together. But when you first walked in the
door, the first day I visited there, they
reached in, they pulled out their badges, they
were cops. And they admitted that only 14
percent of computer crime was reported, because
businesses didn't want to go to Justice,
because if you said there has been a computer
crime and they came out and investigate,
anything they found out could be used against
you in a court of law.
So we are going to have to remove it
from Justice and, I think, the intelligence
MR. FIELDING: That raises a question,
I guess, I really would like all three of your
We have obviously had an historic role
for the FBI, an historic role for the CIA. One
was overseas and one was domestic. And the FBI
is an adjunct to the Department of Justice. It
provides information for the Department of
Justice, their indictments come down. Suddenly
all the information goes into the black hole.
It can't be shared, it is grand jury
information, it is law enforcement information,
but it is being used in the adjudication of
criminal cases and, therefore, doesn't get
How are we going to solve that problem
in any of these schemes?
MR. LARSEN: I think there is a model.
The national infrastructure protection center
is being moved to the new department. They
looked at all source intelligence information,
law enforcement sensitive information which
even included grand jury testimony, and with as
the vulnerability. But like I say, once again,
primarily focussed on cyber aspects of it.
That model is there. It works. There
are certain things that take place in the
counter terrorism task force that also works.
I agree, I don't think we need new legislation,
I think we new need new organization. I think
General Eisenhower got it right when he said
"the right organization will not guarantee
success, but the wrong organization will
Now we have the wrong organization.
We need a new one.
MR. FIELDING: Zoe.
MS. BAIRD: Well, you have probably
the leading expert on your own Commission in
Jamie, on that question. So I won't even try
to venture into how information gets shared,
because she will make sure you are straight there.
But I would say something that is
perhaps not responsive, but I think important,
which is that if much of this information is
not collected by law enforcement, if
intelligence information which is intended for
policy makers is collected through other means,
or under the direction of the Department of
Homeland Security, then you don't put the FBI
in the challenging position of deciding not to
pursue its own rules. You then have a policy
maker who says, okay, this is what we know
about this group of people. What policy action
should be taken? Do we want to prosecute them
to get them off the street? Do we want to
deport them? Do we want to continue to follow
them to see who they are working with outside
the country, or at other levels or in other
cells? Do we want to engage in diplomacy with
the country from which they came to try and
learn more about what's going on in that
country that could lead to a more substantial
terrorist threat by virtue of the fact that we
have this information on their citizens,
perhaps information about relationships between
their citizens and others.
So, if you have in the first instance
the information going to policy makers, then
the policy makers can decide that this is
something that should go into that law
enforcement box. And how black the box is
today is a little grayer than it used to be.
But be as I say, Jamie is the best person to
inform you about that.
MR. KEAN: Mr. Wermuth.
MR. WERMUTH: Intelligence collection
for law enforcement purposes investigation,
arrest and prosecution is, in our view, very
different than intelligence collection analysis
and dissemination for deterrents, prevention
We have said that in our reports, that
the FBI is the best law enforcement agency in
the world. They don't understand intelligence
collection analysis at the strategic level.
They do it for law enforcement and it is
different. They protect it, as you have
suggested, in the grand jury testimony and
investigations. That is one of the reasons
this panel said take the FISA collection
responsibilities out of the FBI and put it into
this reconstructed, this new design of
capability in a stand alone center.
Let me offer an anecdote that I think
is an analogous. In a prior I had something
to do with counter drug policy making and
In 1990, about this time of year in
1990, if memory serves, the counter narcotic
center at the Center Intelligence Agency came
to the FBI and DEA and said, could we see all
of your files on Columbian drug
operations. Of course, the answer that you
might expect was, we can't turn over all our
files to you, there are open investigations,
there is grand jury testimony in there, we might
taint evidence that would be presented in a
So the CNC went away and scratched
their heads for a few months and came back and
said, okay, can we see all of your closed
After some agonizing with people in
the Office of Legal Policies and the Department
of Justice, and elsewhere within the
structures, the Bureau and the DEA turned over
their closed files to the Counter Narcotics
Center. Ninety days later the CNC had mapped the
Cally Cartel to about 95 percent level of
That is the kind of things we are
talking about when we talk about strategic
intelligence versus intelligence for law
enforcements. It is different situation, and
this panel has said that they are not sure that
the FBI would ever be able to change their
culture to understand the difference in the
two. And even if they could, it would take new
generation of FBI agents and leadership,
despite all the great things that Director
Muller and some of the senior people in the FBI
are trying to do.
It is an inherent culture in that
organization that they do things for law
enforcement purposes. They don't do it for
strategic purposes, for deterrents, prevention
MR. KEAN: We will take five more
MR. BEN VENISTE: With respect to
comment that Ms. Baird made in her written
materials relating to agencies rushing out to
collect information and technology on their
own, resulting in stove piping of systems. We
have seen the unfortunately named Total
Information Assessment Office recently
defunded. Undoubtedly, throughout the
Government, since there is this great infusion
of funds thrown at counter terrorism, what have
you observed in terms of duplication of
efforts, duplication of funding, which perhaps
we, in being on the scene and in realtime,
observers of situation can perhaps influence in
some way. And if we could, what would you have
MS. BAIRD: A great deal of funding is
being put into the information collection
capability for the government, but it is being
put into filling up the stove pipes, by and
large. It is not being put into developing a
system of sharing information and at the
federal, state and local level. So very little
money is going into the intersection between
agencies or between the federal and local, and
having the state and local governments fail to
be able to be part of the system.
I would encourage you to look at, and
to ask people to provide you with information
about the dollars that are going to developing
the systems of sharing and integration of a
national system as opposed to filling the stove
pipes of particular federal agencies.
MR. WERMUTH: I am trying to find the
exact cite that the National Strategy for
Homeland Security talked about the creation of
something that it call it a Collaborative
Classified Enterprise, and that was supposed to
be exactly the kind of stuff that Zoe was
talking about, to link all of this together for
both intelligence and information sharing so
that you could get information to the people
who needed to have it, at the right time, at
the right place. You could bring information
that was gathered in appropriate ways, into
this collaborative classified enterprise, was
what the national strategy called it.
We suggested that be in this new
national counter terrorism center that the
panel called for. It wouldn't have to be
there, but it certainly needs to be, as Zoe
said, a comprehensive focused prioritized
mechanism for doing exactly what she was
MR. BEN VENISTE: I approach this with
no preconception, but one of the things that we
have heard a lot about and will continue to
study, is the question of whether this domestic
intelligence collection enterprise is moved out
of the FBI, where it basically now resides, and
put somewhere else.
Two things: One, you have this great
aircraft carrier of the FBI turning. We are in
the process of turning. They have devoted
assets, they have re-trained. They are trying
to do what we are asking them to do.
At the same time there are discussion
that we should go to something like a British
MI5 or the Canadian bifurcation or the French,
God forbid, or something
Is there a suggestion from your
collective experience as to one country which
would be a model, in a democratic country,
which operates in an efficient way that should
be a model, at least in part, for us.
MR. LARSEN: We looked at MI5 very
closely, for example. But we deliberately
stayed away from trying to draw a comparison
with what this panel was recommending with the
national counter terrorism center, including
the domestic collection piece and MI5.
The simple fact is, the laws are
different. The concerns about civil liberties
are different. The concerns about privacy are
different. You might compare some structure
just in terms of where it is located, who it
reports to it, and who can task it and what
some of the limitations are.
We finally came to the conclusion that
there wouldn't be anything advantageous from
making those comparatives because so many
things are different. This panel said this is
a U.S. problem, we need a U.S. solution, and
that's why it recommended what it did, without
any artifical or arbitrary comparisons to the
structures in other countries.
MR. KEAN: We have a couple of
minutes. We have three commissioners who have
been waiting to ask questions; Senator Gorton,
Commissioner Gorelick and Senator Cleland.
Fast questions and answers, if we can.
MR. GORTON: Mine would take far too
long, so I will defer I couldn't even ask
the question in the time.
MS. GORELICK: We all want to hear
that question at some point.
MR. GORTON: You will.
MS. GORELICK: First let me say to Zoe
Baird and to the Markle Foundation, thank you
for directing our attention to, A, the low
hanging fruit of engaging state and local
government agencies and corporate America, and
for teeing up the very important question of
the balance between privacy and the efficacy of
law enforcement and counter terrorism.
My questions are primarily directed to
Mr. Wermuth and Mr. Larsen. They go to the
question of efficacy of commissions.
Mr. Wermuth, I would have thought that
if you read your commission recommendations,
together with the conclusions of the joint
inquiry which just, after all, looked at
intelligence failures, but nevertheless, that
it would have been sickening to you because you
recommended, well before September 11, 2001,
that we have a fusion of intelligence, law
enforcement, immigration information, and that
we engage fully state and local law
enforcement. And when you put that together
with what the joint inquiry said would have
occurred in terms of the apprehension of
leadership of those who perpetrated 9/11, that
if you had gotten that information together you
could have apprehended those people, or
possibly you could have.
It is a very disturbing picture. And
here we are, ten commissioners, a very able
staff, very able people willing to help us, and
my question to you as we are in this first
public hearing, looking to the end of our
process is, do you have any second thoughts
about what you did with your recommendation?
Are there things that we can learn about how to
be more effective and have greater impact, so
that the scenario I just described wouldn't be
repeated in the future?
MR. WOLOSKY: It certainly is
frustrating when you look at this from an
historical context now, to realize how many,
what now appeared to be pressing
recommendations this panel made before
September of 2001. But you have served in a
major department of government and the highest
levels. Others of you have, others have served
in Congress and as chief executives of states.
You know the tensions that exist. You know the
parochial nature of certain issues that exist.
You know the politics, both with a little P and
a big P that often enter into deliberations of
legislative bodies and Executive Branch
That is not to say that any of that
was not well intentioned at the time. Our
agencies do compete with each other. Our
political parties compete with each other.
Heavens, the two Houses of Congress compete
with each other.
I think there is significant value in
commissions just like the one on which you now
sit because you bring a wealth of information
to the discussion without the constraints,
maybe, that you once had when you served within
a specific branch of government or represented
a party in a particular house of Congress.
You will be able, from what we have
learned, you will be able to be more open and
honest and comprehensive, and nonpartisan in a
capacity like this, than perhaps you were in
positions in which you served in the past.
To us that's beneficial. That is not
to say that you need to establish a national
commission for every single problem and expect
it to solve the problems, but you can have some
impact. Of the 79 recommendations that our
advisory panel made in its first three reports,
66 of them have been adopted in whole or in
major part. So you can have an impact. That
doesn't mean that you will get all of the
things right, but if you are a panel that is
composed of the kind of people that are clearly
on this panel, with your expertise and national
recognition. Suffice it to say that, your
recommendations and I dare say they will be
reasonable and logical and sound and supported
by the evidence and everything else, you will
have an impact. You shouldn't be concerned
The only concern would be, can you do
it fast enough to get them into play before the
next events happen.
MS. GORELICK: Thank you. I would
like to hear any comments from Mr. Larsen and
MR. LARSEN: I don't often disagree
with Michael. I disagree a little bit. We had
a close mutual friend, Philip Coleman, when he
sat down to be the director on the Presidential
Commission on Critical Infrastructure and
Protection. He went back and looked at a whole
bunch of commissions and what effect did they
really have. It is pretty discouraging when
you really look at the data out there.
MS. GORELICK: Well, he also, his
commission, the Presidential Commission on
Critical Infrastructure catalogued all of the
vulnerabilities of each of the sectors in this
report, and one questions what has happened to all
that information, and is it being used.
MR. LARSEN: A very good question. I
know NAPSI was very focussed in cyber owning
and the physical dropped off the scope.
But I tell you in January a
recommendation I have for you how to get better
action out of your report. You don't want it
to become shelfware, like so many do, okay,
another report, let's stick it over there.
In January of 2001, Dr. Tara O'Toole
from Johns Hopkins and I, were terribly
concerned about this country being vulnerable
to an attack of smallpox. Something we know
that Iraq has, that could threaten the survival
of the nation.
Now, we could have gotten a small
study funded by the Markle Foundation or
someone, and gone out and written a report and
put it up there and what would it have done?
What we did together was put together that
exercise, Dark Winter, and then not so much the
exercise, but how we took that 35 minute
presentation in a dramatic format, and sat down
with Senator Warner in his office with Senator
Roberts, with Vice President Cheney. We
briefed Vice President Cheney nine days after
9/11 and said this is what it means to this
country only having 15 million doses of smallpox
vaccine. I accept that is very focused, one
small issue. We got a $500 million program out
of that and the country is far more secure.
There is another commission going on
right now looking at another threat and has
come to us and said, could you do a Dark Winter
style thing for us to help us when we finish
our study and our scientific work, to put it
together so we can take it around town and sit
down either in Congressional hearings or
one on one with senior leaders and say, let us
show you what it would be like if we have
another serious threat coming to our country
with the system we have now. Let us show you
what it would be like if we had this new system
A dramatic 30 minute presentation like
that, is something that might help you market
MS. GORELICK: Zoe, do you want to have the
last word on that question?
MS. BAIRD: No. I think enough has
been said. Thank you.
MR. KEAN: Last question from Senator
MR. CLELAND: Thank you very much, Mr.
Chairman. Just one quick one. We may be
getting lost in the weeds here, for the second
day in a row here, I have heard distinguished
panelists say there is going to be another
attack. Mr. Larsen, you said that, the
gentleman here and Ms. Baird. We heard that
yesterday from an expert on terrorism, who has
been studying that since 1974, I think.
That's very scary. Given the fact
that what little we know about Osama bin Laden,
and we haven't found him yet apparently, is
that he generates his energy from the
allegation that particularly America is overstepping
its bounds and has a footprint on
Islamic lands in Egypt, in Saudi Arabia and now
we have a war in Iraq. I mean, are these aid
to Egypt, aid to and a base in Saudi Arabia,
the war in Iraq. Are these actions by the
United States more likely to produce the
counterattack or this next attack, Mr. Larsen?
What elements are there that make you
think we are going to get hit again, and what
would lessen those elements?
MR. LARSEN: The fact that we are at
war in Iraq today, in my mind, there is no
question that it increases the threat of
attacks on our homeland in the short term.
However, if we are we were not at war
in Iraq today and Saddam refused to disarm, I
think the long term, the threat would be even
be more significant. We're not at war today in
Iraq to make it safer this week or this month.
I think it is trying to make a safer
internationally security environment for my
children and your children and grandchildren.
That is what it is.
The international security equation
has changed, as I said in the beginning, with
technology, small actors can seriously threaten
us. It is not just Osama bin Ladin, it is
others, but you mentioned Osama bin Ladin. He
doesn't hate us for what we do in our foreign
policy, I think, as much as and what we are
and what we believe in in this country. That's
not going to change. So I think we have to
understand it. I hate saying that. I hate
saying that to my kids and grandkids down in
Texas that there are going to be more attacks,
but it is a fact that we have to adjust to.
It is going to happen.
MR. CLELAND: Anyone else, Mr.
MR. WERMUTH: I happen to think that
whether we were in Iraq or not we said this
clearly, even before the current conflict
started that the likelihood, for the for all
the reasons that Randy has mentioned, there are
people out there and not just Osama bin Laden,
there are just people out there who don't like
us. And are likely now because the mold has
been broken, and we have had significant
terrorist attacks inside the United States,
that others will be emboldened to do it.
But I mean, let's face it, we had
what could have been a disastrous attack right
down the street in 1993 and a lot of people
said you better be paying attention to that.
You need to understand what implications that
has for the future, and some people listened
but not enough people listened.
The operations in Iraq may do as
someone said yesterday, create another hundred
Osama bin Ladens, but I would suggest that any
number of policies of this country, just
because we do what we do, we are who we are,
might just as well push some of those people
over the edge into attacking us at some point
So I don't think that this country can
stop taking decisive action when it is in the
U.S. national interest to do that, as long as
we have good grounds to do it. Whatever it
is, whether it is economic policy or military
engagement or types of diplomacy or sanctions
or whatever else it happens to be, just because
we are scared of the next terrorist attack.
And I know Senator, that is not what
you were suggesting. I think we,
obviously, have to take into consideration what
reactions our actions may cause in other parts
of the world and within other cultures, but we
still need to continue to try to do the right
thing wherever we interest in the world.
MR. CLELAND: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
MR. KEAN: Thank you very, very much.
It has been a wonderful panel. Thank you so
much for your help and for your past work, and
hopefully we can call on you as we go along in
Thank you all very much. We will try
to get back, if we can, a 35 minute recess, if
we can do that.
MR. KEAN: The Commissioner of Police
and the Commissioner of Fire. They were here
yesterday and have promised future cooperation
with the Commission.
We have also got a statement to be
read into the record by Senator Corzine.
Senator Corzine has been very interested in the
Commission and very helpful to the Commission
at this point, and he had a statement which we
will read into the record.
Today's panel starts now and will end
at 3:00. We have Shawn Kelley, who is in the
Arlington County Fire Department. I appreciate
your being here. William Baker, of the American
Society of Civil Engineers, and Ken Holden from
New York Department of Design and Construction.
I thank you all for being here.
Mr. Kelley, would you like to start.
MR. KELLEY: Good afternoon. My name
is Shawn Kelly and I am Assistant Chief with
Arlington County Fire Department and was one of
the incident commanders throughout the rescue
and recovery efforts at the Pentagon.
On behalf of the Arlington County
Government and the men and women of the fire
services in Northern Virginia and the Washington
D.C. area, thank you for allowing me to address
Like most fire departments in the
region, the Arlington County Fire Department
participated in regional disaster drills
consisting of hospital or college dorm fires,
mass transportation accidents and even
structural collapses. But never did we think of
training for an incident that combined an
airliner crash into a large building,
structural collapse, along with large building
fire that was fuelled by jet fuel.
Following the March 1995 sarin nerve
agent attack in a Tokyo subway that killed
twelve commuters and injured hundreds more, the
Arlington County Fire Department recognized
that America's first responders were not
trained or equipped to handle such emergency.
Our training changed its focus towards large
scale incident management.
From the moment American Airlines
flight 77 crashed into the west side of the
Pentagon at 0938 a.m. and for the subsequent
ten days, this was a major fire and rescue
incident, the responsibility of the Arlington
County Fire Department.
The destruction caused by the attack
was immediate and catastrophic. The 270,000
pounds of metal and jet fuel hurling into the
solid mass of Pentagon is the equivalent in
weight to a diesel train locomotive, except it
is travelling at more than 400 miles per hour.
More than 600,000 airframe bolts and rivets,
and 60 miles of wire were instantly transformed
into white hot shrapnel.
The resulting impact, penetration and
burning fuel had catastrophic effects on five
floors and three rings on the Pentagon
corridors numbers 4 and 5.
This act of evil cost the lives of 198
persons in the Pentagon attack; 194 were innocent
victims and 5 terrorist perpetrators of this
Though the Arlington County Fire
Department did not feel its response to
terrorist attack on the Pentagon was
extraordinary, it did not happen by chance.
The Arlington County Fire Department's
preparedness was a result of years or hard
work, reorganization, intensive contemporary
training and updating command staff education.
The successful response to the
terrorist attack on the Pentagon can be
attributed to effects of ordinary men and women
performing in extraordinary fashion. These
efforts are described through an after action
report that was prepared for the Arlington
County by Titan Systems Corporation.
It was accomplished through a grant
from and support of the Department of Justice,
Office of Justice Programs, Office of Domestic
The After Action Report describes the
activities of Arlington County and the
supporting jurisdictions, government agencies
and other organizations in response to the
September 11, 2001, terrorist attack on the
It is organized into four principal
annexes and four supporting annexes. Annex A
is fire department operations and emergency
medical service activities, and it is the bulk
of the report.
Annex B is about the response of the
local area hospitals and clinics and their
ability to handle communications and the number
of patients that could have been brought to
Annex C covers local, federal and
private law enforcement agencies.
And Annex D is the emergency
management and emergency operation center that
supported the first responders and citizens or
You will see on September 12,
Arlington County public schools were open and
trash was picked up and services continued in
Although the response to the September
11, 2001, terrorist attack is commendable, the
After Action Report contains 235 recommendation
and lessons learned. Each which must be
understood within the context and setting of
the Pentagon response.
The first segment describes
capabilities others should emulate and speaks
to incident command system and the unified
command that was established at this event.
Mutual aid with surrounding and supporting
jurisdictions and outside support, and the
Arlington County emergency management plan that
was put into place, the Employee Assistance
Program, the training that we had undergone,
exercises that we had performed and shared
The final segment describes challenges
that must be met and speaks to self
dispatching, fixed and mobile command and
control facilities, communications, logistics
and hospital coordination.
The Arlington County Fire Department
is addressing these challenges by updating its
communications system, the purchase of a
dedicated command vehicle, establishment of
a logistic segment within the department, and
ongoing coordination with local and regional
In summary, the response to 2001
terrorist attack on the Pentagon was successful
by any measure. Although the tragic loss of
life from this horrific event could not be
avoided, it was minimized. Had it not been for
the heroic actions from the response force and
the military and civilian occupants of the
Pentagon, clearly the number of casualties could
have been much higher.
Damage, although severe, was contained
in area and the fire was brought quickly under
control. The fact that the response force did
not suffer a single fatality or serious injury,
is testimony to the training, professionalism
and leadership of the Arlington County and the
Terrorism, in any manifestation, is an
insidious phenomenon. It strikes without
warning, often targeting innocent people. It
is not intended to defeat an enemy by
overwhelming military force, but to undermine
and weaken its resolve. If the terrorist
intended to weaken our resolve by attacking the
Pentagon, they failed.
In the words of our County Manager,
Ron Carlee, "The cowardly and evil effort to
terrorize our community and our country served
only to unite us more strongly than ever
MR. KEAN: Thank you very much.
MR. BAKER: Yes, my name is Bill Baker
and I am the partner in charge of structural
engineering in Skidmore, Owings and Merrill. I
am here today representing the American Society
of Civil Engineers.
I wish to express my sincere
appreciation for being asked to address the
Commission on behalf of the ASCE/FEMA World
Trade Center Building Performance Assessment
My comments relate to my role on the
ASCE/FEMA team as well as my experiences as a
structural engineer assisting the fire fighters
and contractors in the early days after the
attack on the World Trade Center.
In addition, I will offer my
recommendations as to what may be valuable to New
York and other urban areas in dealing with the
aftermath of future terrorist attacks. These
recommendations include: immediate coordination
of on site contractors and structural
engineers; an archived depository for
construction drawings of all city wide
buildings and infrastructure; and federal
"good Samaritan" legislation for those
When I arrived at the World Trade
Center site after the attack, I was awestruck
at the extent of the devastation. While the
media focused on the destruction of the twin
towers, the damage went far beyond anything
that was conveyed to the general public. The
damage included the total collapse of four
major buildings, the partial collapse and
burnout of three major buildings and extensive
damage to seven additional buildings. Many
other buildings suffered minor damage. The
district's infrastructure, including utilities
and the subway system in the area, was
extensively damaged and parts of it were
The New York City Department of Design
and Construction performed a brilliant job in
organizing the efforts of the engineering and
construction industries to support the search
and rescue and, later, clean up of the site. The
DDC divided the district into four sectors.
Each sector was assigned to a team of
contractors. This was a very successful
Because the contractors were top notch
and adept at managing very large private and
public sector projects, they knew how to
organize the teams, deal with heavy equipment
and marshal resources. However, the
contractors needed the professional assistance
of structural engineers.
The Structural Engineering Association
of New York stepped forward to organize the
services of structural engineers from across
the city, state and country. SEAoNY, as it is
called, assembled teams of structural engineers
to assist each of the four contractor teams. I
urge the Commission to use this approach
developed by the DDC and SEAoNY as a model for
dealing with possible large urban disasters.
In many ways, New York City was a fortunate to
have the DDC and major players from the
engineering and construction industries
available to assist at the site.
In the first critical hours and days
following the attack, what was not readily
available or well organized were drawings
of the buildings, plazas, subway tunnels,
freight tunnels, et cetera. As engineers and
contractors were investigating the extent and
severity of damage, drawings of the original
structure were sorely needed. When it was
necessary to bring in large cranes across
subway tunnels, vaults and plazas, drawings
were an absolute necessity. I strongly urge
all major cities to develop an archive
depository for construction drawings and other
critical information to be available to the
authorities on short notice. A duplicate copy
should be housed in a redundant location.
The structural engineers who assisted
at the World Trade Center site were often in
uncharted territory with respect to
professional liability. There should be
appropriate national "Good Samaritan"
legislation to promote the assistance of
engineers in such situations. While such
legislation exists in high seismic states such
as California and some of the West Coast
states, all states are vulnerable to terrorist
attacks and there should be appropriate
At this point, I would like to focus
my comments on the efforts of the ASCE/FEMA
Building Assessment. The Structural
Engineering Institute, a division of the
American Society of Civil Engineers, was
responsible for organizing this effort and
bringing together the relevant professional
societies with support of FEMA, for an
assessment of the World Trade Center site.
Under the leadership of ASCE, a team of
structural engineers and fire engineering
experts from around the country were brought
together. Because of my expertise in designing tall
buildings, I was asked to join the effort and
be on the five member core group that directed
This type of effort is important
because the advancement of construction of
buildings has often come from the analysis of
failures. These tragic events of 9/11 provided
an opportunity to see how building emergency
systems and structural systems behave in
extraordinary events. Although the media has
focused on the twin towers, there is more to be
learned from the ordinary buildings that were
damaged by the events. We saw and documented
the performance of structures that resisted
extraordinary forces and maintained their
overall integrity. But we also saw and documented
collapses that, based on previous experiences,
should not have happened. It is through the
study of these behaviors that the art of
building design is advanced.
Unfortunately, the ASCE/FEMA team
faced many obstacles while studying the World
Trade Center. The team was not able to
assemble on the site until October 6th. We
could only request and cajole to get drawings
and other information. In fact, we did not
receive access to the twin tower drawings until
January. Nonetheless, the team was able to
perform an invaluable service in our initial,
overall evaluation of the buildings in order to
focus and prioritize future investigations and
In response to this, fortunately, the
National Construction Safety Act that was
signed into law on October 1, 2002 addresses
many of the difficulties faced by the ASCE/FEMA team at
the World Trade Center site. This act
authorizes the National Institute of Standards
and Technology to investigate building
failures. This is similar to the National
Transportation Safety Board investigations of
airlines and other transportation accidents.
This allows NIST teams access to
building failure sites; provides the power to
subpoena evidence; provides access to drawings,
records and other documents; and allows for the
removal and storage of evidence. None of this
was available to the ASCE team.
This legislation is a significant step
forward in creating a vehicle by which the
design and construction industry can learn from
failures. This will help to advance building
technology and improve the safety and
reliability of future construction.
As a structural engineer, the World
Trade Center collapse represents the largest
structural failure in the history of mankind.
From this tragedy, I am confident that we can
learn now to approach catastrophic building
failures in the future and through the National
Construction Safety Act we will continue to
learn how to improve building construction.
Thank you for your attention.
MR. KEAN: Thank you. Mr. Holden.
MR. HOLDEN: Good afternoon Chairman
Kean, Vice Chair Hamilton and members of the
Commission. My name is Kenneth Holden and I am
the Commissioner of the New York City
Department of Design and Construction. Thank
you for allowing me to appear in front of you
The City's Department of Design and
Construction, DDC, was created by the Mayor in
1996 to consolidate most of the City's capital
construction programs. Its mission is to
streamline the design and construction of the
City's infrastructure and facilities by
ensuring that the City's projects are delivered
in a safe, timely, and cost effective manner.
DDC's clients include OEM, the Police,
Fire, Environmental Protection, Transportation,
Aging, Juvenile Justice, Correction, Health and
Cultural Affairs Departments; the
Administration for Children's Services; the
Human Resources Administration; the Public
Library System and the Board of Education.
On the morning of September 11, 2001,
I was preparing to leave my office in Long
Island City for a meeting at City Hall when I
first learned that a plane had hit the World
Trade Center. I immediately went into downtown
Manhattan, and was on the steps of City Hall
when the first tower collapsed. I, along with
many others that day, ran north. Eventually,
around 11:00 that morning I ended up at One
Police Plaza, which was being set up as a
command center. It was there that DDC's role
We realized that the entire
infrastructure of the Port Authority, which was
headquartered in the North Tower and is the
owner of the site, had been decimated, and
therefore a response from them was likely
impossible. FEMA and the Army Corps of
Engineers had not arrived yet. I thus began
trying to get contractors and structural
engineers to the site to conduct a
walk through, in order to assess the stability
of the site and the scope of the response that
was required. DDC was uniquely qualified to
jump into action in this emergency: We had many
construction project mangers and engineers on
staff with significant and varied experience
and we had established numerous contacts with
experienced firms that could immediately
mobilize the equipment and personnel necessary
to help with the search and rescue operation.
Our ability to draw on our own internal
expertise and these widespread outside contacts
allowed for the quick and efficient
decision making this situation required.
At approximately 5:00 that evening, I
conducted a walk through with several engineers
and construction managers. The immediate need
was for lighting, since all electricity was
out. I spent Tuesday night and Wednesday in a
mad scramble to locate light towers to
illuminate the site, and also to bring in heavy
equipment to lift debris, so that fire fighters
could fight fires, and the search and rescue
operations could go on. We worked closely with
the Police Department to set up police escorts
to get the contractors over the bridges.
DDC staff was pulled from their
regular duties to organize and manage
demolition, excavation and debris removal
operations. Many worked 18 hour days, seven
days a week, to respond to the emergency.
In the first days, I recall being
stunned by rescue efforts to lift and demolish
the north pedestrian bridge with many fire
trucks underneath, and wondering if there were
any survivors. I watched a priest praying over
the smoldering remains of Building 7, and ran
into a contractor and cried on his shoulder.
However, I could not allow myself much time to
feel, because we assumed there were survivors
in the piles of debris and we had to come up
with a plan to get them out.
Using emergency procurement
procedures, four construction companies were
hired on a "time and material" basis. Those
firms hired numerous subcontractors for
scaffolding and netting, demolition, health and
safety planning and monitoring, hazardous
materials removal, shoring, structural
engineering, hauling and barging.
In cooperation with the Port
Authority, the Fire Department, Police
Department and numerous other agencies, DDC
handled hundreds of details and questions every
hour. The site was immediately and immensely
hazardous for rescue and clean up workers. We
divided the site into quadrants and placed
netting on surrounding buildings, to secure the
site for the rescue effort. We came up with a
Site Safety Plan to address hazards throughout
the site, from cranes dangling ironworkers in
baskets facing precariously leaning pieces of
the towers, to voids in the debris that could
swallow a grappler.
Just walking on the site was hazardous
because the debris could shift at any moment.
Yet hundreds of fire fighters, police officers,
rescue workers, laborers, crane operators, iron
workers, construction management personnel and
DDC staffers worked around the clock in close
proximity to literally hundreds of potentially
dangerous objects and situations. Throughout
this time, the war like atmosphere was surreal,
with Army, National Guard and NYPD providing
Quick, but safe decisions regarding
where to put the cranes had to be made,
inspection of the slurry wall and water in the
basement were conducted, while numerous fires
were still burning and smoldering. Underground,
it was still so hot that molten metal dripped
down the sides of the wall from Building 6.
Cars both burned and pristine, were suspended
in the air balanced on cracked parking garage
Along with the Building Department and
Structural Engineers Association of New York,
DDC assessed 400 buildings in the surrounding
area for structural integrity. Over 200
engineers worked, above and below ground, to
monitor the structural integrity of the
buildings that surrounded the World Trade
Center complex, to ensure that the debris pile
remained stable during debris removal and to
monitor the stability of the slurry wall.
There was constant inter agency
coordination, and daily meetings were held,
which included many Federal, State and City
Government agencies brushed aside
their normal bureaucratic tendencies and
effectively said to one another, "What can we
do to help?" Although FEMA and the Army Corps
of Engineers usually take over disaster sites,
to their credit, they recognized that DDC had
pulled together an effective team of the best
and brightest, so instead they worked with us.
They told the City to continue its work and
they guided us to make sure we were doing the
work in a manner that would allow FEMA to
reimburse us. They allowed us to use "time and
materials" contracts, which they do not
Police officers, fire fighters and
Port Authority Police officers spent countless
hours searching for survivors and remains. DOT
re routed traffic, the Mayor's Community
Affairs unit set up a family assistance center
and consoled families of victims, the Fire
Department put out the fires, the National Guard
and Police Department provided security. The
Department of Sanitation cleaned the site and
watered down the streets, and OEM mobilized
command centers at the Police Academy and Pier
92 from which it supplied the coordination and
organizational focus necessary to complete a
job of this magnitude and complexity.
Throughout the operation, finding
survivors, and then later human remains, was
always a priority. But to do that we had to be
able to remove the debris and steel.
Cooperation between Federal, State and City
agencies was especially crucial in setting up
bargaining operations at Piers 25 and 6, to
handle the staggering amount of steel and other
debris that had to be removed from the site.
The Fresh Kills Landfill, which was closed, was
re opened and mobilized to accept the steel and
debris from the site. Steel and debris from
the site was sent to Fresh Kills where it was
examined and sifted. As the Department of
Sanitation could no longer handle the steel
with their existing equipment, and our
engineers thought the steel would destabilize
the landfill, DDC received verbal permission to
ship the steel to New Jersey. By the end of
June 2002, an astounding total of over 1.6
million tons of steel and other debris were
removed from the site.
As the site became more a
reconstruction area, infrastructure
coordination was required to handle numerous
concerns, including massive amounts of conduit
in the streets; sewer, water main and street
repair; reducing the perimeter to allow
businesses and residents to return;
establishing roads in the World Trade Center
complex; fewer cranes, more grapplers;
continued focus on site safety; and equipment
maintenance, especially in view of the strain
of keeping machines operating 24/7 in the
extreme conditions of heat and dust; all the
while trying to remain sensitive to the
emotions of victims' families and uniformed
rescuers, proceeding with dignity and
solemnity, and trying to get the job done
What's happening now and what are our
plans for the future? DDC is working together
with OEM to address future preparedness
concerns and to make sure efforts are
coordinated, and in fact, is currently
re building OEM's new emergency command center.
DDC and OEM have received a grant to create a
protocol for emergency responses for
contractors, and specifications for procuring
contractors in the event of an emergency.
Please urge Congress to enact
legislation providing for federal indemnity,
making it clear that contractors can go in and
do the work in the event of another disaster,
and not incur liability. The four construction
companies that DDC contacted put aside all
other business and standard operating
procedures and responded with a sense of
patriotism, working without contracts. The
indemnity issues remain unresolved, and these
companies have been incredibly patient.
However, the costs of defending themselves
against lawsuits may be economically
devastating, and such considerations could
prove prohibitive, in the event that they are
called upon again.
The largest and most emotional rescue
and recovery job in American history was also
an exceptionally safe project, due to a
combination of our safety plan and its
enforcement, and luck. There were no deaths
and minimal injuries; which is absolutely
incredible, in light of the magnitude of this
job and its hazards.
The work that the City and its
employees accomplished reflects the
extraordinary talent, dedication and heart that
makes New York such a special place. From the
first days at emergency headquarters at P.S.
89, a few blocks from Ground Zero, where we all
struggled to make sense of what needed to be
done and to find ways to do what was necessary,
to the final emotional days of the cleanup, DDC
staff and other City employees exhibited a
strength of character, determination, and a
sense of duty that is inspiring.
New York City can do extraordinary
things. Everyone involved, engineers and
architects, surveyors, uniformed personnel,
numerous diverse groups of City workers,
Salvation Army and Red Cross volunteers,
private contractors and construction project
managers, operating engineers, ironworkers and
laborers, can all be proud of what we all
achieved together, possible only because we
were united in a spirit of cooperation and
resolve to get the job done.
MR. KEAN: Senator Max Cleland will
lead the questions.
MR. CLELAND: I'd like to say that Mr.
Kelley and Mr. Baker and Mr. Holden, I don't
think any local responders have ever been
called upon to do what you have been able to
do. From Arlington to New York City, all of us
in America are proud of all of you. Mr. Baker,
you said this was the greatest structural
collapse in the history of the world and, Mr.
Holden, that makes your clean up the biggest
clean up that has ever been done based on this
Mr. Baker, I understand there were
some conclusions to the Civil Engineers'
report. Could you talk a little about that,
about some of the weakness you found in the
structure of the World Trade Center.
MR. BAKER: This initial report was
really more of question of our report than it
was trying to find findings. It was a very,
very complicated site with a lot happening. We
are trying to get this document released, the
Word Trade Center Performance Study, which is a
FEMA document is available to you. What we
were trying to do was, we are trying to pull
the information together that was available,
and somewhat package it so that it would be
available for future researchers and try to
prioritize. That was mainly the emphasis.
We put together a few likely scenarios
for some of the collapses, but we gained no
conclusions as to what they were. A lot of our
questions, certainly there were a lot of
discussions about the nature of the collapses
of the twin towers.
As a structural engineer, I have to
say that most structural engineers were
surprised at the collapse after it had survived
the airplane impact, but in retrospect, maybe
we should have known better.
One of the things that surprised us
quite a bit was the collapse of Building 7. It
didn't get a lot of press, but it was a
47 story building, 2 million square feet, a big
building. And it was the first building that
had ever collapsed, ever, that had been a
fireproof steel building that collapsed in an
uncontrolled fire. So it was the first time.
That building was not hit by an airplane, so
the collapse of that building is a very
important one, and that is one that the study
is ongoing on.
There were two likely scenarios
presented. One is, diesel fuel, and a lot of
emergency generation in that building. Some
people give that credibility. We don't know.
The other was perhaps just a simple paper
storage fire. Turns out one of the best
sources of fuel there is, is paper, okay. It
could have been something as simple as a file
room that burned for seven hours.
Those are things it really wasn't a
question of nailing the thing. I think it will
probably take a couple of years before we
really know why some of these buildings
MR. CLELAND: From the audience I
heard a phrase there "what about fire
proofing?" I guess it was based on code; right?
MR. BAKER: Yes. There are questions
about fire proofing in the buildings. Building
7, I am not aware of any issues, and that's
certainly part of the new study. There were
some questions about the fireproofing in the
towers. There had been efforts to increase the
thickness of some of the fireproofing in the
towers, and whether or not that was done. It
was not complete at the time of the impact.
Tower 2, which is the second one hit,
the first one collapsed, was hit in a zone
where the fire proofing had not been upgraded.
It is an unknown thing if that was significant
or not. It is quite likely that that
particular structure would not have survived
regardless, because there is a theory that is
kind of post this report is that, even though
the fires, that were burning there weren't in
the sense of building fires that large, there
was a lot of fireproofing that was knocked off.
MR. CLELAND: Lot of what?
MR. BAKER: A lot of fireproofing that
was knocked off by the impact of the airplane.
These airplanes were going extremely fast.
They are going cruising speeds down that low.
It was, I think, close around 560, 600 miles
per hour, if I remember correctly. So they are
going very, very quickly. There is a lot of
debris, ripping off a lot of fireproofing, and then the ensuing fire.
MR. CLELAND: Mr. Kelley, what was
your biggest challenges at the Pentagon?
MR. KELLEY: Our challenges were
actually manifold. First was perimeter scene
security. Here you have the nation's defense.
You have a hole in the building. You have
rescuers and responders responding to assist
and aid. Both civilian, fire, police and
gaining control of those folks and making sure
that we had accountability for those people.
Getting logistics to the scene and
getting the materials that we needed to the
scene. Though it wasn't a huge problem, it was
at first because the Federal Government had let
out because there was a terrorist attack, so
now this log jammed all the highways and byways
that we needed in order to get materials in,
until we got control and got all those people
gone, and then we could start getting in the
resources that we needed. Those were
probably the two biggest things in a large
Insofar as the Fire Service is
concerned, the attack inside the Pentagon it
is a very big building. You have 982 foot
corridors. We wear 45 minute, 30 minute air
packs and we had to do some very creative air
management with our air packs where we would
actually stay off air, crawl down hallways as
long as we could, go on air, try and fight some
fire, and remember how long it took us to get
in so that we had air to get back out, so we
wouldn't lose anybody.
Another challenge was each of the
evacuations on the first day while we were
actively engaged in firefighting. The first
evacuation was the structural collapse on the
heliport side of the building. Dropping
the hose lines, losing ground that we had
gained in fighting the fire to evacuate out.
Those hose lines being burned up, equipment we
had left behind, having to re amass that
equipment and go at it again. Those were all
challenges to us on that first day in order to
get the fire under control.
MR. CLELAND: That's amazing. Hearing
your testimony, all of you, it reminds me of a
line from Admiral Nimitz after the battle of
Iwo Jima that "uncommon valor was a common
virtue" and it sounds like it to me.
Mr. Holden, I would like for you to
shift a little gear here and talk to me about
the psychological impact of you and your
wonderful people and crew working for so long
on such a massive project, dealing with such
tragedy. Has the City put together any kind of
program to help the psychological readjustment
of those workers who worked so hard at Ground
Zero. What do you see about that?
MR. HOLDEN: Actually, I believe FEMA
has put together a program that is open to all
New Yorkers, as well as the people who both
the construction workers and engineers who were
down at Ground Zero. I believe it is Project
Cope and the Liberty Project which are these
broad based counseling services.
I have talked to all my people and
still meet with them quite regularly, and a lot
of people have taken advantage of these FEMA-
sponsored programs. They have told me that the
people are really quite competent and quite
helpful, and it has been a big help actually.
MR. CLELAND: It seems like to me that
that's part of the terror of terrorism. It is
not just the people who die in the incident,
but the impact, the washover, the
psychological impact on the entire country and
on those people who were nearest the flames, so
to speak. In many ways just like combat, they
live with that experience forever.
Mr. Kelley, do you want to talk to us
a little bit about some of your workers and the
psychological impact on you?
MR. KELLEY: Yes. In our Department
and in Arlington County Government they embrace
a very strong Employee Assistance Program.
At Ground Zero, at the Pentagon, from
the very moment after the attack, we actually
had EAP workers with the collapse rescue teams
and the firefighters right there on the scene,
24 hours a day, for all ten days that we were
there. Even if it was just to go get somebody
an apple or to bring a cell phone to them to
speak to their spouse or their family while they
still working, to take some of the stress and
pressure away. It was very important.
As far as wellness for the community
and to make Arlington whole again and the
region whole, once again we got a grant and
they started a program called Community
Resilience, where they went physically door to
door they learned this from Oklahoma City,
where they had clinicians that went door to
door throughout the resident and the business
community, first in the Pentagon region and
Crystal City area, but then expanded out
through Arlington and into the schools, to help
the community deal with stress and to deal
with the things that they find after an attack
There is a website that folks can go
to, to get pointers and to get tips and it's
www.communityresilience.com, and it has very
good information for any community.
MR. CLELAND: As a firefighter, and
you and your firefighters, when you go in to
talk to kids and children, they have been
powerfully impacted. They don't have a lot of
defenses that adults have, maybe sometimes that
good. Can you tell us a little bit about the
impact on some of the kids in the schools, and
what you are telling the kids?
MR. KELLEY: Well, the impact is
twofold. The impact is to our own children who
are scared when their parents, the police
officers and the firefighters, go to work now.
Daddy or mommy, are you sure you are going to
come home? And so to reassure them and get
In the schools, the best way that we
deal with kids we got wonderful drawings and
wonderful sentiments from the kids and you
could really see their feelings, in what you were
talking about, in their art work and in what
they were saying, which we used as inspiration.
We have these things in all our fire stations,
hung all over the place. We brought them down
to the scene and put them right up on the side
of the Pentagon as folks would send these
things to us, to keep the rescue workers going.
We say to the kids, yes, we are still
here. Yes, some horrible things have happened
and this is a tragic event, but we are still
here. We are going to be safe. We were there
and we are standing here now talking to you.
We need to move on.
That's kind of how we are handling it,
but at a more elementary level.
MR. CLELAND: Mr. Holden, you have a
whole city, a whole big community to deal with.
For you and some of your workers, I am sure you
get called upon by the schools to go out and
talk about the experience. What are you
telling the kids, can you share that with us?
MR. HOLDEN: Actually, I haven't given
a lot of talks to kids. I have given talks to
university students and engineering students
primarily about the engineering projects. But
insofar as disaster response, I have not given
a whole lot of talks, if any, to elementary or
junior high school kids.
MR. CLELAND: Mr. Baker, you have
looked at this report. What is the one
conclusion that you would draw and would give
to this Commission or to your fellow structural
engineers around America about what you have
MR. BAKER: It sounds trivial, but you
cannot allow large airplanes to fly into
MR. CLELAND: I am sorry?
MR. BAKER: You cannot allow large
airplanes to fly into buildings. You cannot
design against it. Smaller planes, like that
tragedy down in Tampa where the kid flew the
little airplane, that is not gong hurt a
But if you have a large commercial
aircraft, passenger or cargo, I don't care why
it is there, those large airplanes, you cannot design
against it. If you look at the 767, it is a
big airplane. There are bigger airplanes out
there, quite a bit bigger. There are the 747s,
there is A380 Airbus which is on the boards in Europe, much
larger planes. Both cargo and passenger
airplanes have to have foolproof safety systems.
MR. CLELAND: Mr. Chairman, some of
the other Commissioners might have some
MR. KEAN: Yes, they do. Commissioner
MR. ROEMER: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First of all, I remember 9/11 as if it
was yesterday, as a member of Congress, and a
member of the Intelligence Committee and as
somebody who was right across the river from
the Pentagon, Mr. Kelley.
After a full day of scrambling around
trying access to intelligence and figure out
what was happening to the country and how we
should react in making sure the legislative
branch was moving forward in getting the right
briefings, I felt like many Americans and
wanted to contribute somehow.
Everybody had seen what had happened
in New York all day. So at about 11:00 or
12:00 at night, I drove across the river and
was able to get through the barricades and
right to the front, about 500 yards from the
Pentagon. I sloshed through ankle deep water
to get over there to see if there was anything
I could do, or at least to see it, so that I
could see what these terrorists had done to our
country. I was mesmerized, looking at this
huge fortress, this structure that looked like
a steel boot had come down on the top of it and
just made a paper accordion out of it.
You were there. You had fire trucks'
ladders going up both sides of the building
that was still on fire at that time of night.
Your folks were scrambling everywhere to see
what they could do to help others. And I will
never forget, and I tell my four kids about
this, turning around from that site of horror
and terror and seeing all of you as an army of
America, lined up to heal America and take them
forward. And you guys did it, and accomplished
so much, and I think it's the story of courage
and bravery that so many of us are proud of,
and inspire us to work hard and try to get to
the bottom of what happened and try to make the
country a better place in the future, as well.
I want to personally thank you and
everybody in the Fire Department of Arlington
and Alexandria, and rescue crews, and if you
can take that back to them, this Commission
very much appreciates what you help us with.
And New York, Mr. Holden, I can't say
I was fortunate enough to come up to New York
City. I can say that I will never forget it,
coming up a couple of days afterwards as a
member of Intelligence Committee, and going to
Ground Zero. And I went on a boat up the
Hudson River because it was too difficult to
get through the town. A sergeant of the Police
Department was taking us up, driving the boat.
I asked Tony what he was doing on the
day and how he felt New York was reacting to
it. After telling me about all the people that
were literally jumping off into the water to
try to get away from the collapsing buildings,
and he would ferry them over to New Jersey for
I asked him again, how does New York
feel they are doing now. This grizzled veteran
of probably all kinds of things that he had
seen and heard in New York, looked at me. He
was 55 or 60, he had huge tears falling down
his cheeks. He said, "we feel like we could
never do enough to help each other."
Well you did, and you came forward and
did extraordinary work in record time to clean
things up and to move people forward to try to
heal the process.
I wish Commissioners Scoppetta and
Kelly were here so that we could thank them. I
hope you will pass that on, on our or behalf
and I hope you will make sure that we get an
opportunity to talk to them at a later date.
Along those lines, Mr. Baker, I want
to ask you, based upon your expertise and your
insight on this, it is quite a compliment to
pick somebody of your skill for this kind of
endeavour, to look at the twin towers, in
particular, and see what happened. So I want
to ask you, specifically, given this counsel
that you bring, this insight that you bring to
You said you were pleasantly surprised
by the integrity and the structure of some of
the other buildings. Were you concerned or
disturbed at all by any of the features, the
design and the structural engineering of the
twin towers when you studied them?
MR. BAKER: It took a long time to
come to grips with the collapse.
MR. ROEMER: When you did come to
grips with it, what did you conclude?
MR. BAKER: I am not sure that I
think the building performed remarkably well,
actually. You never want it to collapse, but
one of the things you might say about it, it
was a very strong building. It took a huge
amount of damage. So many columns were knocked
out. We counted the ones on the perimeter and
a large number of columns were knocked out
Later studies, ongoing studies have indicated
that a large number of core columns were
knocked out and the building still did not come
down immediately. So the nature of the
structure was enough that it could hold itself
together long enough for people to get out.
A lot of people did get out and
approximately, I believe, 99 percent of the
people who were below the impact zones were
able to get out, according to articles in New
York Times and U.S.A. Today.
MR. ROEMER: I just have a couple of
questions and then I want to make sure the
other Commissioners have an opportunity to ask
questions as well.
Apart from the plane hitting these
buildings and bringing them down, let me ask
you specifically about the structure of the
buildings, or the uniqueness of them apart from
the plane hitting them.
Do you know of any other high rise or
super high rise buildings that have floors
composed of open web trusses spanning up to 60
MR. BAKER: No, I do not.
MR. ROEMER: Is that something that
would concern you?
MR. BAKER: It is something to be
looked at very closely. We were not able to
look at that closely in this situation.
What you are referring to is these are
commonly called bar joists. You see them in
the roofs and ceilings of big box retail like a
Wal Mart. It is a very lightweight truss.
There are things the industry needs to do to
study these things further.
MR. ROEMER: So that could be of
concern and that disturbed you?
MR. BAKER: It is something that we
don't have the answer on and I personally would
not ever use them in this type of building.
MR. ROEMER: So you will recommend
other high rise buildings not use them.
MR. BAKER: Until we know more about
it. If fact, there is draft out for the New
York City Code which has recommended a
temporary moratorium on the use of these types
of trusses in high rise buildings until it is
better understood how they can be fireproofed
and the integrity of the fireproofing.
The issue comes down that they are
very small bars, about one inch diameter and
whether or not you can adequately fireproof
MR. ROEMER: Specifically, I know
Senator Cleland asked a general question about
fireproofing. Let me ask you a more specific
Was half an inch thickness of
fireproofing on the floor trusses sufficient to
give a three hour fire rating, in your view?
MR. BAKER: I doubt that a three hour
fire rating was required for the floor trusses,
just an as a point of reference.
MR. ROEMER: I didn't ask that.
MR. BAKER: No. I would be very
surprised if a half inch would give three
hours. We did not study that specifically, but
I would be very surprised.
MR. ROEMER: Finally, did you see or
hear of any evidence in the course of your
inquiry, that the fireproofing of the twin
towers was inadequate? Obviously, you just
said you had a concern, but any others?
MR. BAKER: We do know there was an
ongoing program to replace fireproofing in the
towers, that the Port Authority, as the floors
are re-tenantized and made available, that they were
going back in there and putting additional
fireproofing onto the floor trusses.
There had been some issues of some of
the fireproofing falling off of some of the
core columns in the elevator shafts, and there
had been some earlier lawsuits. We were not
able to get access to that information to know
MR. ROEMER: You tried get access to
MR. BAKER: Yes, we had no authority. It
was all locked up in legal there were
nondisclosure agreements on lawsuits and the
like. We couldn't get the information.
MR. ROEMER: Thank you, Mr. Baker.
MR. LEHMAN: First, I would like to
associate myself with the earlier comments of
great admiration. I think that you and you
colleagues made the whole country very proud,
and impressed it the world with the way the
response was immediate. It engaged every asset
available in the cities and the districts
available, and everyone on the sites showed
courageous disregard for their own personal
safety, not to mention the trial lawyers
association, which the Mayor alluded to earlier
So please take the questions that I am
going to ask, in the spirit that they are
intended, which is to get onto the record as
much of the lessons learned as possible so that
we can make appropriate recommendations for the
future. This is not intended to try and point
fingers at anyone or so forth.
There have been a lot of questions
raised since then about why, after it was
clear, this was perhaps a measure of weeks
rather than days, that there could be no more
survivors from the wreckage, why was the site not
made a crime zone and given the proper
protection so that evidence and forensic
investigations could be taking place? Why
wasn't that done?
MR. HOLDEN: I believe that security
around the site, and the Police Department, in
fact, did call it a crime zone, and it was very
difficult to get access to the site as the
Police Department and the National Guard and
Army were called in to provide security to
prevent people who need not be at the site, you
know, were kept away from the site.
As you mentioned, we believed that
there were, in fact, survivors for many weeks
early on. So our main goal was basically to
remove, particularly the heavy steel beams to
allow the Fire Department and Police Department
to continue with their searching operations,
with their rescue operations.
MR. LEHMAN: You mentioned the steel.
There have been other questions raised about
why the steel was removed to a site and then
ordered destroyed without being made available
to the overall investigation of the structural
clues that would have helped in really
evaluating where failures took place and
whether these codes were met. Why and how was
the decision made to destroy that steel?
MR. HOLDEN: Again, you have to go
back 19 months and put yourself in the position
of trying to find survivors.
Our priority at that time, in
September and October, was still looking for
survivors. The steel was precluding that from
happening because much of the debris early on
was being sent to the Fresh Kills Landfill. It
became clear after three or four days that the
equipment that the Department of Sanitation had
to handle the City's garbage was not equipped
to be able to pick up those large pieces of
steel. And those large pieces of steel were
preventing the rescue workers from crawling
into crevices and voids underground.
We really had no place to put it.
There is no place to put 170,000 or 180,000
tons of structural steel. We were pressed by
the urgency of trying to find survivors. We
looked at a number of operations. We knew that
some of the steel might have asbestos-
containing materials on it. We knew that we
couldn't just dispose of it, but it was not an
option to continue sending it to the Fresh
Kills Landfill where all the debris was being taken.
The only options, based on discussions both
internally with our engineers, as well with New
York State with the State of New Jersey and with
the Environmental Protection Agency was to
basically ship it off to New Jersey and recycle
it. No one was volunteering to just store that
huge volume of steel. They would only take it
if they could melt it and recycle it.
We really couldn't figure out any
other option at the time.
MR. LEHMAN: This was a sort of crisis
management group decision, it wasn't any one
person that dictated it?
MR. HOLDEN: This was my decision.
MR. LEHMAN: Okay. I have read that
the twin towers, because they were owned by the
Port Authority were actually exempt or outside
of the enforcement codes for the City of New
York. Is that true?
MR. HOLDEN: I'm not a Port Authority
employee, but the buildings are in fact Port
Authority and I am almost certain that they are
exempt from following New York City Building
MR. LEHMAN: Isn't that something that
we ought to address or that should be remedied?
Why should a building like that in the middle
of the City of New York be exempt from State
and City codes?
MR. HOLDEN: I think that warrants
MR. LEHMAN: Mr. Baker, I would like
to ask you, did the buildings conform, at the
time of their construction, to prevailing
standards of survivability and structural
integrity that were prevailing at the time of
MR. BAKER: In the short period of
time that we produced this report, that was not
studied in detail. My understanding is that
NIST, at this point, has actually, is trying to
commission a study to do a detailed review of
the prevailing codes, particularly the New York
City Building Codes vis-a-vis the construction
documents. So that was not done as part of the
MR. LEHMAN: We look forward to
receiving that when that is done, or if we can
be of any assistance to see that it is
completed before the end of our report, that
would be very helpful.
Mr. Baker, how was the decision made,
or what were obstacles made to keep you from
the site for so long while so much of the
evidence was being removed? I don't mean
evidence in terms of liability and so forth,
but evidence in terms of learning the lessons.
MR. BAKER: I am not sure I know all
the details, but basically we were told that
the folks on site did not necessarily want
other extraneous people walking around. They
had their hands full at the moment.
I personally was on the site much
earlier than that because as part of the other
activities, as part of assisting the search and
rescue. But the rest of the team was not able
to get access because of the nature of
activities before October 6, when we actually
did get access. I believe we were deemed to be
superfluous at that point.
MR. LEHMAN: Perhaps, Mr. Holden, you
might shed a little light on it. Was it
because they were deemed to superfluous or was
it, by this time had the fear of litigation, as
the Mayor spoke to yesterday, begun to enter
the calculations of City officials.
MR. HOLDEN: It took a lot of months
to go by before I started thinking about
litigation, quite frankly.
I am not sure exactly about when the
American Society of Civil Engineers came on
site. I know we worked with SEAoNY, which Mr.
Baker alluded to earlier, which was a State
organization of structural engineers who worked
with numerous city structural engineers, as
well as structural engineers we had hired to
both examine buildings and look at the site.
The problem, again, going back 18, 19
months ago, was that you had a very difficult
site to control. As you alluded to earlier, it
was a crime scene so access was limited. We
also, especially that first week or two, had
thousands of volunteers coming down to the
site, which a was a wonderful and much
appreciated outpouring of spirit. However, it
was an extremely unsafe site and we were very
concerned that having hundreds and thousands of
people walking around the site, could cause
further fatalities. And if the Mayor gave us
one clear marching order, it was that no one
else was to die at that site.
I am not exactly certain when the
American Society of Civil Engineers were
looking to gain access, but early on some of
the constraints were, in fact, the fact that it
was a crime scene and there were just safety
concerns. We were trying to grapple with what
was there, and how many people we could allow
on site, how stable the various piles were, how
I am sure you remember the facades of
towers 1 and 2, we were not certain about
stable those facades were. We were very
concerned about having so many people walk
around the site.
However, I would never use word that
Mr. Baker used, calling the engineers
"superfluous," they were extremely helpful.
Those are just some of the general
difficulties in allowing people on the site.
MR. LEHMAN: Thank you for your
responses. They are very helpful.
MR. KEAN: Thank you, Commissioner
MR. BEN VENISTE: I have a question
for Mr. Holden. Following up on my friend and
colleague, Max Cleland, who was quite
interested in the effects of terrorism and the
lingering trauma of those who have experienced
it firsthand, My alma mater, Stuyvesant High
School is located four blocks north of World
Trade Center. On September 11, 2001, they were
evacuated from the school. The evacuation
notice was "run for your lives."
Hundreds and hundreds of teenagers,
from all parts of the City, made their way on
their own out of the toxic plume, watching as
people jumped to their deaths from these
buildings, an extraordinary traumatic
Can you comment on what the City has
done with respect to trying to provide guidance
counselling follow up for the children who were
directly exposed to this tragedy?
MR. HOLDEN: I wish I could, but I am
really not qualified. Those questions are
really much better addressed either to the
Commission of Department of Mental Health, or what is now
the Department of Education. But really the
Department of Design and Construction was
really limited in its focus to demolition of
the existing structures and debris removal.
I am just not qualified to speak to
MR. KEAN: Commissioner Gorelick.
MS. GORELICK: This is for Shawn
Kelley. A number of us on this panel have
served at various times at the Pentagon and we
are aware that the cafe in the middle of the
Pentagon is called Ground Zero.
MR. KELLEY: Not anymore.
MS. GORELICK: It was. So we knew
that we were working in a place that was a
We heard testimony yesterday that the
evacuation procedures at the Pentagon were not
understood, at least, and not well practiced
and could not be followed by the people in the
So my question for you is, did you
conclude or did your After Action Report
conclude that there were any failures in the
evacuation process at the Pentagon after the
plane slammed into it?
MR. KELLEY: We have emergency
incidents at the Pentagon every day. We run an
average of two responses a day at the Pentagon.
I personally investigated a fire there two
weeks prior. So it is 11 percent of our call
volume is to federal facilities within
We have never experienced in the past
a problem in evacuating the occupants from
different sections or parts of that building,
out and away from where the danger is, along
with the assistance of the Defense Protective
Services, the police officers, that work in and
out everyday around the building.
In this particular event or in this
particular incident, to have this plane and
almost the entire plane made it into the first
floor of this building, and to penetrate in
three rings, and I am not going to go into the
floorplan of the Pentagon, but to penetrate in
three rings and then pop out into what they
call A&E Drive.
I will say that most all the fire
doors did work, in the outer corridors. That
is good and bad. The fire doors closed like they
should, and then it was dark and held smoke and
could have possibly caused further injury or
death to some of the folks.
They had also just done construction
and updated the Pentagon and installed some new
windows which were not openable. That also had
some impact on the building not being able to
breathe or let out its products.
With regard to where the Pentagon is
now, I can share with you that they have
installed some enhancements to assist in easier
evacuation. In fact, in my opinion, it is
state of the art now. It is an example for the
rest of nation to follow. Some of those things
can't be shared. It is truly, truly an example
now. The employees do practice evacuation
The Pentagon has even approached my
office, the Fire Marshal's office, to have two
deputy marshals assigned down there, a third party to
ensure that proper code enforcement is
conducted. Not that it isn't now, but just to
have a third party assessment to assist in
things like evacuation plans and drills, and
things like that.
MS. GORELICK: Thank you very much.
MR. KELLEY: You're welcome. If I
may, the After Action Report, if you don't
mind, you did mention it. It is available for
free for everyone, I am not trying to make an
ad, but it is real important in the Fire
Service that we study ourselves and learn from
action and have other persons learn, good or
bad. If there is criticisms, then folks need
to fix them so that if things didn't go so
well, that they are prepared or do better.
MS. GORELICK: That is an excellent
great note on which to end the hearing.
MR. KEAN: I would like ask a question
before we end. Mr. Holden, first, when you got
to the site, who was in charge?
MR. HOLDEN: I would say the Fire
Department and the Police Department.
MR. KEAN: Jointly in charge?
MR. HOLDEN: Yes, the Fire Department
was clearly putting out fires and the Police
Department was handling security.
MR. KEAN: Three or four hours later,
who was in charge?
MR. HOLDEN: The same people.
MR. KEAN: Did that change later?
MR. HOLDEN: I don't think that really
changed until, again, now I am just giving you
my impressions. I don't think that really
changed until several days later when the
National Guard, Governor Pataki brought in the
National Guard, and I believe some Army units
were down helping with security. Although
certainly, the Fire Department was playing a
major focus on the interior.
MR. KEAN: Mr. Baker, when you got on
site, who was in charge then?
MR. BAKER: My impression when I was
there was that the people in overall charge of
it was the Fire Department of the sectors, but the
operational control were the contractors.
These contractors were very, very good. They
are used to managing very large projects and
have command structures within their groups,
who know how to bring in heavy equipment. They
know how to deal with subcontractors, and all
that kind of stuff.
So a lot of the operational, who goes
there, we want to see if that building is going
collapse, let's go into this thing and look
around. Really our interface was with
the general contractors, they did an excellent
MR. KEAN: I want to thank you all
very, very much. This has been a very good
panel and a very instructive panel. Thank you
for your answers. Thank you for your presence,
we appreciate it very much.
That ends our hearing.
(Whereupon, the proceedings were