Seventh public hearing of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States

Statement of Russell E. Travers to the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon The United States
January 26, 2004

Good afternoon, Chairman Kean, Vice Chairman Hamilton, and the Members of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States.

I appreciate the opportunity to join my colleagues from the Terrorist Screening Center (TSC) and the Department of State (DoS) to discuss progress to date and future plans regarding borders, transportation, and managing risk. Broadly speaking, my remarks will focus on TTIC’s development of a single repository of known and suspected terrorists and our associated support to watchlisting, as well as ongoing efforts to improve information sharing. At the request of the Commission Staff, I will specifically address a number of developments that have occurred since 9/11: the standup of TTIC and its role in supporting the TSC; the movement of TIPOFF, the State Department’s terrorist database, into TTIC; changing business processes that are improving the quality of support; and the results of ongoing Intelligence Community (IC) efforts since 9/11 to enhance watchlisting support. I’ll supplement these remarks with a few comments about our future watchlisting support efforts and a discussion of key developments in information sharing.

As the members of the Commission well know, TTIC, along with the Department of Homeland Security, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense, U.S. Northern Command, the Terrorist Screening Center, and other organizations was stood up to help confront the threat to U.S. interests posed by international terrorism. Al Qa’ida and other terrorist organizations continue to make plans to carry out attacks against U.S. citizens and interests worldwide. While many of these plans have been disrupted since the tragic events of 11 September 2001, constant vigilance and proactive efforts on the part of many government departments and agencies are still required to prevent the loss of additional U.S. lives in terrorist attacks. In recent years we have learned that terrorist threats that initially appear to be directed at overseas targets may actually be threats against our homeland, with the reverse being possible as well. In the face of this challenge, we need to integrate our efforts – both overseas and domestic – to ensure we are working together in a seamless manner. It is of particular importance that we continue to make progress on the issue of border security, including the development of both improved screening initiatives and a streamlined approach to U.S. Government watchlisting.

A key ingredient of the U.S. Government’s counter terrorism strategy is to ensure that the many government agencies and departments involved in the war on terrorism work closely together and share threat information and analysis that could be used to prevent terrorist attacks. The 1 May 2003 establishment of TTIC is supporting this objective. As directed by the President, TTIC was created to integrate and analyze terrorist threat-related information collected domestically and abroad to ensure that intelligence and law enforcement entities work toward the common goal of protecting the homeland. As a part of this mission, TTIC is responsible for developing and maintaining an all-source database on known and suspected international terrorists. When fully operational this database will directly support the Terrorist Screening Center that began operations on 1 December 2003 and which will consolidate terrorist watchlisting.

On 16 September 2003, the President issued Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD)-6, entitled “Integration and Use of Screening Information to Protect Against Terrorism.” This HSPD built on the standup of TTIC and established the Terrorist Screening Center. The HSPD and an accompanying Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) signed by Attorney General Ashcroft, Secretaries Ridge and Powell, and Director Tenet on behalf of the Intelligence Community (IC) established TTIC’s role with regard to the screening process.

The HSPD and Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) direct that TTIC maintain a terrorist identities database that includes, to the extent permitted by law, all information the U.S. government possesses related to the identities of individuals known or appropriately suspected to be or to have been involved in activities constituting, in preparation for, in aid of, or related to terrorism [“Terrorist Information”], with the exception of “Purely Domestic Terrorism Information,” (i.e. information about U.S. persons that has been determined to be purely domestic terrorism information with no link to foreign intelligence, counterintelligence, or international terrorism).

TTIC is to make this information available to the Terrorist Screening Center for use in various screening opportunities. TTIC’s identities database will serve as TSC’s single source of “Terrorist Information,” with the exception of “Purely Domestic Terrorism Information.” The FBI will serve as TSC’s source for “Purely Domestic Terrorism Information.”

As my colleagues will discuss in more detail, TSC will be able to draw on TTIC’s database of known and suspected terrorists and FBI’s database for “purely domestic terrorism” information, to develop a single, integrated terrorist screening database. As such, all appropriate organizations and entities will be able to work from the same unified, comprehensive set of anti-terrorist information, enabling rapid action when a suspected terrorist is screened or stopped.

Building on TIPOFF…

As part of the USG’s effort to build and maintain a consolidated terrorist identities database, TTIC, on 17 November 2003, assumed responsibility for the functions of the Department of State’s highly successful TIPOFF counter terrorist program. As the Commission knows, The Department of State’s TIPOFF Program was created in 1987 to address the needs of Consular officials, who lacked a sufficient mechanism to determine whether individuals applying for visas to enter the United States were known or suspected terrorists. In 1991, this program was expanded to assist Immigration and Customs inspectors in determining if individuals attempting to enter the United States at ports of entry were known or suspected terrorists. This system has evolved through the years, becoming the leading conduit through which U.S. Government Agencies disseminate information on known or suspected international terrorists, who are non-U.S. persons, to various government entities for use in preventing terrorists from entering the United States.

As a consequence of the terrorist attacks of 9/11, additional demands were placed on the TIPOFF Program; these ranged from an overall increase in the volume of watch listing nominations from originators, to new potential recipients of TIPOFF information, such as local law enforcement and the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) for use in passenger screening. In March 2003, TIPOFF’s senior management, recognizing the need to enhance its capabilities, drew up plans for executive level deliberations, proposing a significant expansion of personnel, physical space, and budget. With a strong base upon which to build, TTIC is implementing its responsibilities under HSPD-6 by ensuring that all terrorist identity information contained within the TIPOFF database is merged with that in the TTIC and other databases.

Terrorist Information being consolidated under the President’s TTIC and TSC initiatives includes names, aliases, dates and places of birth, identification and travel documents, unique or distinguishing physical features, biometric data, and individuals’ affiliation with terrorist acts or groups. In the past, many of these data points have been missing from an identity record held by a particular department or agency because this information in its entirety is frequently unavailable to any single collector of identities information. As a result, counter terrorism officials often have not had the necessary information to make a positive identification of individuals they are screening or monitoring for their terrorist connections. In addition, while all of these types of information have been collected before, in the past the relevant pieces of data were segregated in “data silos” where one element of information would never touch another. One database may have held photos, another fingerprints, and yet another travel records and biographic data. By integrating information from multiple sources, TTIC is positioning its database to incorporate more of these missing parts, thus building a more complete picture on each known or suspected terrorist. We are in the midst of building on current efforts and next summer will begin to consolidate all of these data points into a single repository where major streams of data may be rejoined across all aspects of identities information.

The merger of the TIPOFF and TTIC programs will provide federal officials with the capability to access a unified and comprehensive list – currently consisting of more than 120,000 records. Hundreds of records are either created or updated each month based on the collection efforts and information provided by the Intelligence Community, and the Departments of State, Homeland Security, and Justice.

Finally, TTIC’s intent is not only to develop a “reference library” for terrorist identities information, which could be used for several purposes, but to also make it available to the full range of users involved in the war against terrorism. As such, this reference library will be accessible to TTIC analysts, under the conditions set out in DCID 2/4 and in accordance with rules and guidelines for handling U.S. person information that are issued pursuant to EO 12333. A redacted version, removing the most sensitive compartmented information, will be accessible by the Intelligence Community through TTIC Online, formerly known as CT Link. As I will discuss later, TTIC Online already reaches a wide array of Federal organizations that have a need for TIPOFF and other terrorism related information.

…And Expanding the Capabilities

In anticipation of the transfer of the TIPOFF program to TTIC, several months of planning and preparation took place. Much of this preparation involved the challenge of relocating the TIPOFF database to TTIC, while maintaining continuity of operations. Prior to the move, the TIPOFF database was upgraded and three new databases were built: one primary operational database, one back up, and one developmental. In addition, the State Department’s communications network was extended to the CIA HQ complex where TTIC is temporarily located, prior to TTIC’s co-location with CIA’s Counterterrorist Center and FBI’s Counterterrorism Division, at a new location in mid-2004. On 17 November 2003, TTIC’s Terrorist Identities Group (TIG) assumed full responsibility for the production component of the TIPOFF international terrorism program. TIPOFF Web currently reaches over 1300 analysts.

Current operations reflect the re-engineered watchlist process outlined in the 16 September 2003 HSPD-6 and the accompanying MOU. TTIC/TIG can receive terrorist related information from any source. Upon reviewing that information, if there is a nexus to international terrorism, a record is created in TTIC/TIG’s database. If that information meets a minimal standard, it is forwarded to the Terrorist Screening Center; various federal agencies conduct reviews and make a determination whether the referenced individual is appropriate for entry into their system and what course of action will be taken if that individual is encountered. TTIC is notified of any matches, and information obtained by investigators is channeled back into the TTIC database.

Since assuming responsibility for the TIPOFF Program, TTIC has taken several concrete steps to ensure we are postured to fulfill our obligations:

• TTIC has increased the number of analysts working on the creation and enhancement of terrorist identities records from 6 to 26. Despite the time required to train new personnel since November 17th, we have added over 8,000 new records.
• TTIC is further engaging in discussions with originators of terrorist identities information to expand the terrorist information present in the database and to automate the process by which originators feed information to TTIC. We are in the process of including appropriate U.S. person information.
• In addition, TTIC is working with the relevant federal departments and agencies to update the 4 June 2002 MOU among CIA, DIA, NSA, State, and FBI, that established the rules by which TIPOFF could use intelligence obtained from these originators. As part of this effort we are working to expand the number of unclassified data elements that can be passed to the Terrorist Screening Center, beyond the four agreed upon in the 4 June 2002 MOU; this should help reduce the potential for false hits and increase the Terrorist Screening Center’s efficiency.
• TTIC has developed the information architecture necessary to provide information access to the TSC and has been proactively supporting TSC leadership in developing the TSC concept of operations and systems architecture.

Community Support to Watchlisting

As part of the Government’s overall effort to improve the watchlisting process, there has been a concerted effort to scrub intelligence holdings and to ensure that individuals who should have been watchlisted are, in fact, so listed.

In February 2003, the Director of Central Intelligence asked the CIA’s Counterterrorist Center (CTC) to review all of the holdings in its electronic database to identify any individual who should be watchlisted. To date, CTC has reviewed nearly 1.5 million documents from CIA, NSA, DIA, FBI, Department of State, and the Armed Services. As a result of the review, CIA has nominated about 1300 individuals for watchlisting. Those names have been entered into the TIPOFF database, as well as provided to the FBI’s Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force, whose mission is to determine whether any of these individuals is present within the United States. With the standup of the TSC, it too has received all names associated with this review of historical reporting.

CTC has also strengthened its current watchlisting efforts. Watchlist training is mandatory for all line officers in CTC. That training leaves no doubt that each officer is responsible for nominations for watchlists. It clearly states the standards and processes for watchlisting.

To support new watchlisting efforts, CTC has developed electronic tools that allow officers to refer individuals for watchlisting with a click of their computer mouse. They also can check to determine whether a person has been nominated from their desktop. Finally, CTC has established a separate component to address watchlisting nominations so that officers directly engaged in fighting the war on terrorism have some help with the mechanics of the watchlist nomination process.

As has been the case with other organizations, CTC’s watchlist review has made a difference -- individuals have been stopped from entering the United States. Some have been identified who may be in the United States—and the FBI is investigating those cases. The review continues; CIA assesses that it may need another six months to complete all of its phases and anticipates that additional names will be nominated. CIA has high confidence that any individual who should be nominated for watch- listing will have been nominated for watchlisting by the end of this review.

The FBI also is engaged in a historic review of its international terrorism subjects, to determine if any of those individuals whose cases have been closed over the past decade, should be watchlisted. This review also will result in the FBI’s relevant international terrorism subjects being entered into TTIC’s terrorist identities database. To date, 33 of the FBI’s 56 field offices have provided details related to the review of previous cases, with 16 field offices having completed the project. FBI is in the process of staffing additional positions in TTIC to support this effort.

As previously mentioned, the legacy TIPOFF Program was originally intended to assist the Department of State’s Consular Affairs and legacy INS/Customs to keep known or suspected terrorists off U.S. soil. The vast majority of these individuals have been non-U.S. persons, residing abroad. This is now changing for two reasons: first, the database has been expanded to include both U.S. persons, if there is a nexus to international terrorism, and non-U.S. persons. Hence, the individuals under the FBI’s investigation for ties to international terrorism are now being added to the TTIC database. Second, with the FBI’s presence globally expanding, the FBI is now in a position to identify known or suspected international terrorists located abroad.

Finally, as noted earlier, TTIC is expanding its database by reaching out to additional originators of terrorist identities information. TTIC is reaching out to the Department of Defense and the Department of Homeland Security entities that have access to potential terrorist-related information. In addition, under HSPD 6 the Department of State is developing a proposal for enhancing cooperation with certain foreign governments, beginning with those countries for which the United States has waived visa requirements, to establish appropriate access to terrorism screening information of the participating governments. These efforts have the potential to give us additional historic and contemporary data to evaluate for potential watchlisting purposes.

Results Since 9/11

Since 9/11, the TIPOFF holdings have grown substantially. Many more organizations within the U.S. Intelligence and Law Enforcement Communities are nominating individuals for watchlisting purposes, as reflected below.

Changes in TIPOFF: September 01 to the Present
	As of 9/11/01	As of 1/08/04	Change
Records in TIPOFF	61,489	120,012	95%
TIPOFF records added to State Dept database(CLASS)	48,161	100,510	109%
TIPOFF records added to DHS database (IBIS)	23,375	57,710	147%
Agency contributions:
CIA	36,321	79,219	118%
DIA	2,898	4,764	64%
FBI	3,096	6,862	122%
NSA	16,211	19,017	17%
State	46,739	77,962	67%

Future Developments and Future Challenges

Over the next six months, we anticipate progress on many fronts. Both TTIC and the Terrorist Screening Center are developing capabilities to further strengthen their ability to carry out their respective missions. TTIC is working with the various federal agencies to develop MOUs to enhance its ability to push more identifying information to unclassified users. TTIC is also actively working with the FBI, DIA, DHS, Interpol, and others to standardize the procedures for receiving relevant terrorist information. Among other things, the TTIC is working with the federal community to create metadata standards and tag data so that information received can be passed through to end users at different classification levels.

Despite our best efforts, however, we must recognize that a names-based terrorist identification system has inherent limitations. Under any circumstances the potential for false positives is high. But with foreign names, and particularly with Arabic names, the challenges are even greater; for instance, the transliteration of Arab names is a very inexact science. Spelling can vary, and the protocols for which names are actually used can be difficult for Westerners to understand. Couple this with the standard terrorist use of nicknames, aliases, “noms de guerre”, and increasingly sophisticated forgeries, and the analytic challenge for the intelligence, law enforcement and homeland security communities becomes increasingly complex. Moreover, we are dealing with an enemy that is focused on recruiting Westerners, women, and generally “clean” individuals, who haven’t come to our attention. Finally, as we have seen with the “transit without visa” program, terrorists are always looking to exploit potential vulnerabilities that might give them a further edge.

The Intelligence Community and the homeland security community are leveraging experience to build new organizations, develop new methods and techniques, and develop advanced technologies that are required to respond to these problems. TTIC, in particular, has embarked on a data base upgrade that will help move beyond a names based approach to one that is focused on identities. We are currently engaged with the FBI and DHS regarding fingerprint and facial recognition techniques and are beginning to build their capabilities into the next generation database. This database, the Terrorist Identities Datamart Environment (TIDE), is scheduled to enter its first phase of deployment in the summer of 2004. This new generation database will fulfill not only a watchlisting mission, but will also be used as an analytic tool. This database will begin to incorporate biometrics to form true “identities,” rather than using a purely name-based system.

INFORMATION SHARING

TTIC’s ability to establish and maintain a database of known and suspected terrorists is directly related to a free flow of relevant information across the government. While there is undoubtedly room for improvement, substantial progress has been made since 9/11 overcoming the numerous impediments to information sharing. Because the issue is so central to the TTIC mission in general and the database in particular, it’s worth a brief summary to review that progress.

To begin with, a solid legal and policy groundwork for information sharing has been put in place since 2001: the USA PATRIOT Act; the Homeland Security Act; the Presidential decision to create the Terrorist Threat Integration Center; the Memorandum of Understanding between the Intelligence Community, Federal Law Enforcement Agencies, and the Department of Homeland Security Concerning Information Sharing; the Director of Central Intelligence Directive establishing TTIC; and Homeland Security Presidential Directive 6 creating the Terrorist Screening Center have all played a role in driving the improvements in sharing terrorism-related information.

With the underlying legal and policy framework in place, the Community has been focusing on the new business practices, cultural changes, and technical systems needed to fully implement these policies. Both in terms of the absolute amounts of available reporting and the extent to which it is widely shared in the Community, the government has made substantial strides. For example, if we compare intelligence reporting on terrorism and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) now, with reporting in 2001, we see a growth of about 250%. On average there were approximately 900 terrorism and WMD- related reports per day in late 2001 and there are about 2200 per day now. More importantly, that information is being widely disseminated to those intelligence, law enforcement, and homeland security analysts who need to see it.

Information sharing has both horizontal and vertical components. TTIC’s focus is on the horizontal aspects – ensuring that the Federal structures have the required information to fulfill their missions. Vertical information sharing is primarily the province of the FBI and DHS. FBI ensures that information flows to state and local law enforcement. And DHS, through the Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Directorate (IAIP) ensures that threat information is shared, and augmented with by protective and preventative measures to ensure the safety and security of the nation’s critical infrastructure and key assets.

The entire Community has been involved in facilitating this information sharing through a myriad of business process and technical advances. On TTIC’s part, we stood up an Information Sharing Program Office to oversee implementation of the Information Sharing MOU. Our focus has been on the key impediments to a free flow of terrorism-related information. One common and longstanding handling restriction on much of the intelligence that comes from more sensitive sources is known as “Originator Control.” With such a control on a report, any agency receiving this intelligence must seek the permission of the originating agency before it can share that information with another organization that needs to see it. Originator Control, or “ORCON” is one of the means used to protect sensitive intelligence sources so that the flow of valuable intelligence can be preserved. If information from a sensitive source is thought to be too source revealing, Originator Control can be placed on the information to protect the source. Unfortunately, while ORCON is a valuable tool to ensure future intelligence production from our sensitive sources, it also impedes our ability to share that intelligence. As a result, we are working to reduce the use of ORCON on terrorism-related reporting to the bare minimum needed to protect critical sources. It is quite clear that Community efforts in this regard are bearing substantial fruit: if we compare the use of ORCON on terrorism-related reporting during the same periods, the latter half of 2001 and the latter half of 2003, we find that the use of the ORCON restriction on this category of reporting had dropped by almost half. Roughly 11.4% of terrorism-related intelligence was ORCON during this period in 2001, and only 6% was ORCON during this same period in 2003.

We are also working to expand and standardize the use of various mechanisms and practices that enhance information sharing. Key examples would include “writing for release” and the increased use of “Tear Lines.” A tear line is a portion of a classified intelligence report or document that contains a sanitized version of the information in that report. By using tear lines, important information in a highly classified intelligence report can be shared more widely with those who need it, but do not have the necessary clearances to read the full report. As such, even though ORCON continues to be used in some reporting, a tearline is often issued to ensure that the bottom lines are available to all relevant analysts.

We are in the process of standardizing practices across the government on the use of tear lines in terrorism-related reporting, but there has already been significant progress in expanding the use of tear lines in this reporting since 2001. If we compare the number of tearlines in 2001 with the number in 2003, tear line utilization increased by almost 70%.

There is still much we need to do in terms of standardizing the usage of mechanisms that enhance information sharing. For example, tear lines are most effective when the author of the intelligence report understands the kinds of information the tear line recipient needs. That is largely a matter of education and improving general communication between elements of the government that have not traditionally had much interaction and often have little understanding of each other’s missions, duties, and information needs. Other problems are more difficult: very real security policy issues do exist, and all parties are working hard to protect sources and methods and yet share as much information as possible. While no one is prepared to declare victory over a series of challenges that grew up over several decades, by any imaginable standard the Community has made substantial progress.

TTIC Online: Terrorism Information Sharing

One reflection of our progress can be seen in the ability to electronically access terrorist- related information. Over the past eight months TTIC has focused on the technical initiatives necessary to promote information sharing. Because of our mission, we are in the unique position of having to improve our ability to manage information, while creating an environment in which analysts can benefit from a diverse array of Intelligence Community and law enforcement sources. These demands require an architectural approach that makes best use of extant technology and legacy systems while ensuring smooth insertion of emerging technology in the future. TTIC has unprecedented connectivity to all major networks of all classifications to facilitate information sharing with TTIC partner agencies.

To promote information sharing across the entire Community of analysts working the terrorism problem, we launched the TTIC Online (TTOL) website in August 2003. This serves as the front door for the Intelligence, Homeland Security and Military communities to access a broad range of Counterterrorism threat information. This highly secure capability can reach virtually the entire structure of the Federal Government, hosting over 2500 users in the JWICS Top Secret community. TTOL reaches not only the traditional national intelligence community terrorism analytic elements, but also the JTTFs, the military Commands, and numerous entities outside the Intelligence Community which have a need for terrorism threat information. The current breakout of the population of TTOL users and the full range of organizations that access the network can be seen below.

TTIC Online User Organizations

Not only does TTIC Online reach across the government, it is also being populated to function as a consolidated repository of terrorist and WMD threat information. It contains over three million documents, including finished intelligence from CIA, TTIC, DHS, and FBI; disseminated reports from the Intelligence Community; access to a repository of tearlines from CIA, NSA, and DoD; warnings, alerts, and bulletins issued by FBI, DHS, and others; and links to other terrorist-threat resources on Intelink. TIPOFF resides on TTOL and, as a result, we anticipate being able to double the number of analysts who have access to this critical tool.

The following chart further illustrates the extent to which our changing business practices, further enabled by technology, have substantially improved overall information sharing across the Community.

An important element of TTIC’s strategic vision is the deployment of TTIC Online at additional security levels to a broader CT community. A new presence on SIPRNet later this year will make Secret level CT information available to a wide array of DoD, DHS, Law Enforcement and Department of State users. TTIC also plans to deploy a Sensitive But Unclassified (SBU) presence of TTIC Online on the Open Source Information System (OSIS) network. This SBU access point provides important support to DHS and the FBI. TTIC continues to solicit new users from across the Federal Government, and to add new sources of CT information.

SUMMARY

Mr. Chairman, Mr. Vice Chairman, members of the Commission, TTIC continues to work with our partners across the Government to implement the President’s vision and to ensure that the most accurate data on known and suspected terrorists is made available to the TSC and the many other organizations involved in border security and the war on terrorism. I hope you will agree that we have made demonstrable progress in both the creation of a single data base as well as the ongoing effort to share relevant information across the government. Given the complexity of the analytic problem as well the challenge of integrating diffuse data sets from a wide range of organizations, we undoubtedly have a great deal to do. Nevertheless, TTIC has already accomplished a great deal in the past 8 months and we have both a sound plan and adequate resources for the future.

Thank you for the opportunity to testify and I look forward to your questions..

Mr. Travers currently serves as the Associate Director for Defense Issues at the Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC), responsible for interaction with all DoD analytic efforts focused on terrorism. He manages government wide information sharing initiative, TTIC’s red team and data mining efforts and the development of the USG’s terrorist identities data base.

From 2001 to 2003, Mr. Travers served as the DIA Deputy Director for Policy Support responsible for intelligence support to the Office of the Secretary of Defense, managing the activities of Defense Intelligence Officers and overseas liaison offices, coordinating National Intelligence Estimates, administering Special Access Programs, organizing support to Homeland Defense, and overseeing foreign disclosure and exchange programs.

Mr. Travers served as the Chief, Defense Intelligence Liaison, London from 1999 – 2001. He was attached to the British Ministry of Defense to manage defense intelligence coordination between the United States and the United Kingdom.

As Special Assistant to the Director for Intelligence, J2, Joint Chiefs of Staff (1996-1999), Mr. Travers supported the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff and Combatant Commands with a current and crisis intelligence mission.

From 1989 through 1991, Mr. Travers was the Assistant National Intelligence Officer (CIA), responsible for the production of National Intelligence Estimates on military and other security issues ranging from Iraq to North Korea to the Soviet Union.

Mr. Travers has also served as a Soviet analyst for DIA (1982-1989) and as a U.S. Army Military Intelligence Officer (1978-1981).

Mr. Travers has published the following articles: “The Coming Intelligence Failure,” Studies in Intelligence, 1997, and “A New Millennium and a Strategic Breathing Space,” Washington Quarterly, 1997.

Mr. Travers earned his J.D. from the National Law Center, George Washington University, and is admitted to the Virginia Bar; M.B.A., Chapman College, Orange, California (1982); B.A. Government/B.A. Economics, College of William and Mary, Williamsburg, Virginia (1978).